


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Foreign Ministry Spokesman: 'Serious Study' on Signing CW Convention

*OW0312092292 Beijing XINHUA in English
0901 GMT 3 Dec 92*

[Text] Beijing, December 3 (XINHUA)—China is conducting a serious study on the issue of signing an international chemical weapons [CW] convention, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said here this afternoon.

In reply to a question about whether China will sign the International Chemical Weapons Convention adopted by the United Nations yesterday, Li Jianying said at the weekly press conference that China supports the purposes and objectives of the chemical weapons convention and is conducting a serious study on the issue of signing it.

Bush Wants to Finish START II During Term

*OW0812053492 Beijing XINHUA in English
0452 GMT 8 Dec 92*

[Text] Washington, December 7 (XINHUA)—U.S. President George Bush and his team are "working vigorously" for completion of the strategic arms reduction pact with Russia (START II), before he leaves office in mid-January.

A considerable amount of work is going on behind the scenes on the START treaty, White House Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said Monday.

Fitzwater dismissed reports that Bush was going to meet Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Alaska this month, saying no meeting between the two had been scheduled.

The START II accord, which was agreed upon by Bush and Yeltsin in mid-June in Washington, would cut U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals from more than 11,000 long-range warheads on each side to fewer than 3,500 each.

It also would commit both nuclear powers to eliminating missiles that carry multiple warheads.

Bush had sent Yeltsin "at least a couple of letters on various details of the start proposals," and discussed the treaty over the phone with Moscow on Sunday, Fitzwater said.

According to a report in Friday's LOS ANGELES TIMES, Russian negotiators want to change some multiple-warhead SS-19 missiles into single-warhead missiles by removing all but one warhead, an arrangement rejected by Washington.

The Russians also want to retain silos used for storage of SS-18 missiles after the missiles are destroyed. Washington and Moscow appear to be moving toward a compromise, the report said.

In addition, Moscow is seeking explicit reaffirmation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which restricts each country's ability to deploy weapons to defend against incoming nuclear missiles. Washington reportedly has agreed to this request.

CAMBODIA**SRV Rejects Khmer Rouge Charges of Toxic Chemical Use**

*BK0412115692 Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network
in Vietnamese 1100 GMT 4 Dec 92*

[Text] On 2 December, a spokesman for our embassy accredited to the Supreme National Council of Cambodia issued the following statement:

On 14 November 1992, a military spokesman of the Khmer Rouge [KR] faction issued a statement that

fabricated about the so-called Vietnamese plan to use toxic chemicals during the 1992-93 dry season in Cambodia.

The spokesman for the Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam accredited to the Supreme National Council of Cambodia is authorized to flatly reject this brazen and ill-intentioned slander of the Khmer Rouge.

The spokesman for our embassy accredited to the Supreme National Council of Cambodia once again affirms that Vietnam has withdrawn all its troops from Cambodia and has not sent any forces and weapons to Cambodia since September 1989.

ROMANIA

Hungary To Fly Under 'Open Skies' Accord

Hungarian-Romanian Agreement Announced

AU0212130892 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1133 GMT 2 Dec 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 2/12/1992—Based on an "Open Skies" Agreement between the Governments of Romania and Hungary, signed in Bucharest on 11 May 1991 and in force starting 27 February 1992, the Hungarian party will make an observation flight between December 2-4.

It will be the first of this kind since the enforcement of the said agreement. An aircraft of the Hungarian Army carrying French photo equipment will be used for the operation. The same kind of equipment is mounted on an aircraft of the Romanian Army. The Hungarian aircraft team will be accompanied by Romanian military experts, as is stipulated in the agreement. As part of the said agreement, the Romanian party is going to have a similar flight in Hungary on a date to be announced 48 hours before, informs the Romanian Ministry of National Defence.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Comments

AU0312110192 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1859 GMT 2 Dec 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 2/12/1992—During the Foreign Ministry's weekly news conference of Wednesday, December 2, Mr. Traian Chebeleu, secretary of state at the Foreign Ministry of Romania, spoke about the observation flight a Hungarian crew would do over Romania on the same day, in keeping with the Romanian-Hungarian open sky treaty.

In that context, Mr. Chebeleu said: "Beyond its significance on the bilateral plane, this action is a useful experience, during the very period when the states that signed the multilateral treaty for an open sky from Vancouver to Vladivostok are in the process of ratification of that important international juridical instrument."

Mr. Chebeleu also pointed out that it was a real premiere, as this was the first observation flight to be done in keeping with an international agreement for an open sky; so far both the two states and the other states have done only experimental flights of the kind.

As for the general evolution of the Romanian-Hungarian relations, Mr. Traian Chebeleu stated that their improvement or normalization was a permanent concern of the Romanian Government that favors in principle further negotiations on the general political treaty between Romania and Hungary.

EGYPT**U.S. 'Pressure' To Sign CW Convention Alleged**

NC3011120592 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 24 Nov 92 p 1

[Report by 'Abd-al-Sattar Abu-Husayn: "U.S. Pressure on Egypt To Sign Treaty on Chemical Weapons"]

[Text] AL-SHA'B has learned that the United States recently put intense pressure on Egypt to force it to sign the treaty banning the proliferation of chemical weapons [CW], which is scheduled to be endorsed by the UN early next year.

Sources say the U.S. pressure followed Egyptian activity on the Arab level that sought to draft a unified Arab stand linking the Arab states' signing of this treaty with Israel's agreement to establish a zone free of mass destruction weapons and sign the treaty for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Israel's signature on this

treaty would place its nuclear installation under international inspection. The U.S. Administration has dispatched the U.S. assistant secretary of state for defense affairs to Cairo to persuade officials to sign this treaty, claiming that such a step would create what he called the atmosphere of confidence necessary for making the current negotiations succeed. The U.S. official stressed that Israel will sign the treaty to encourage the Arab states to follow suit.

The same sources added that there are increasing fears of several Arab states signing the treaty, so depriving the Arabs of an element of pressure on Israel, compelling it to subject its nuclear installations to inspection and destroy its arsenal of nuclear weapons. The sources added that the U.S. Administration sets out the Arab states' signature on this treaty as a condition for it to exercise a more effective role in the so-called peace process, as the U.S. official claimed.

During his recent talks in Cairo last week, Israeli Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres refused any talk of raising the issue of Israel's nuclear arsenal in the current talks.

GENERAL

Ukrainian Vice Premier on Willingness To Disarm

WS0712133492 Kiev KYIVSKA PRAVDA
in Ukrainian 24 Nov 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "We Do Not Need Too Many Weapons"]

[Text] This, in particular, was declared by Ukrainian Vice Prime Minister Ihor Yukhnovskyy at his meeting with German reporters. Ukraine, he pointed out, had long been on the western strategic line of the former USSR, and this is why a large number of weapons had been gathered on its territory. As soon as Ukraine wants to be an independent, peaceful, and non-block state, it will be ready to get rid of such a large amount of weapons.

Russian Response to Icelandic Proposal on Conventional, Mass-Destruction Arms

MK2611155592 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 26 Nov 92 p 9

[Report by Anastasiya Romashkevich: "New NATO Disarmament Proposals: Icelandic Set of Proposals Discussed"]

[Text] Discussion of Iceland's proposals on weapons nonproliferation began today in Vienna during talks within the CSCE framework. The Russians are studying the document and have so far refrained from making detailed comments.

Iceland submitted the package of documents on mass-destruction weapons and conventional arms nonproliferation last Thursday. It was stipulated that the proposals came from a "group of states," although it did not say precisely which states. Clearly, Iceland, as a NATO member, consulted its alliance partners. The set of documents contains proposals on limiting conventional, nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons proliferation. Iceland, in particular, asks the states participating in the conference to present to the United Nations by April 1993 any information pertaining to arms exports and imports and display restraint in supplying weapons to conflict zones, and also recommends that they subscribe to international documents regulating the proliferation of arms and military technologies and take part in international seminars dealing with these problems. What is more, the proposals make provision for the qualitative intensification of information exchange between the states in the sphere of the arms trade.

Your KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent was told by Andrey Vorobyev, first secretary of the Russian Foreign Ministry Department for Disarmament and Control of Military Technologies, that the Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry are currently studying and working on this document. According to Vorobyev, the

Russian side regards Iceland's new proposals as "skillful and competent" and consonant with Russia's position. He did not rule out, however, the possibility of Russia's submitting some addenda.

According to information received from the Foreign Ministry, the Russian delegation at the conference led by Vladimir Shustov, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, will not voice an opinion on this issue in the immediate future. This will only take place once it has examined the documents, tentatively in December.

Mr. Vorobyev also said that at this moment the Russian delegation is working in three other areas: It is working on proposals to "harmonize the process of information exchange," as well as on a code of military conduct and on questions of military planning that the Netherlands submitted on behalf of NATO countries late last month for the conference to examine.

History of SLBM Developments in 1950s

934P0025A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Nov 92 p 5

[Article by Rear Adm (Ret) Viktor Dygalo, candidate of naval sciences: "Sea-Launched Ballistic: The First Launchings"]

[Text] The events to be discussed here assumed their place in their historical "niche" long ago. The confrontation between the USSR and the USA, separated by an ocean, determined the desire of the two superpowers to utilize the vast expanses of water for mutual nuclear deterrence. In 1955 the USSR successfully tested the first sea-launched ballistic missiles. At that time the Americans were following the path of designing cruise missiles. Rear Admiral (Retired) Viktor Dygalo, the author of several books on the navy, was a direct participant of the missile launchings that established the foundation then for new naval conceptions.

In July-August 1955 the submarine "B-62," which was under my command, crossed by the Northern Sea Route from Murmansk Oblast to a permanent station on Kamchatka as part of a special-purpose expedition. However, the submarine's combat service in this formation was unexpectedly interrupted. An order to go to Vladivostok to join a brigade of ships under construction and repair was received in late October 1955. As for what brought this decision on, I did not receive a sensible answer.

Upon his arrival, brigade commander Captain 1st Rank Petr Ivanovich Vosmak told me, without revealing all of the details prematurely, that the submarine was there to undergo modernization as a missile weapon system. Special pains were taken to impress upon me the strict secrecy of the project. The submarine was placed in Dalzavod's drydock. It was obscured from view in the direction of the sea by large floating canvas-covered panels. Few at the plant knew what we were doing. Preparations for work were made during the day, and assembly was conducted at night. Modernization

entailed removing four groups of storage batteries from the fourth compartment and replacing them with two vertical shafts containing launchers for R-11-FM single-stage ballistic missiles. The main missile launch control instruments were located in the central post (third compartment) and in the fourth compartment. The plant was not the only entity that participated in the modernization project. A large number of specialists from defense enterprises and design offices of missile building industry participated as well. Considering the extremely poor equipment availability in Far Eastern industry back then, the labor of these people certainly became a real act of heroism.

The project to modernize the submarine was conducted out of the design office of Nikolay Nikitich Isanin, a prominent scientist in shipbuilding, a twice-awarded Hero of Socialist Labor and the chief designer of many classes of warships. He was appointed technical director of the entire project. Development of a launcher that could launch a missile from a submarine traveling on the surface was assigned to the design office under Yevgeniy Georgiyevich Rudyak. This collective had to solve the problem of launching a ballistic missile with regard for rolling of the ship. F. Abramov was the actual author of the project (unfortunately his patronymical is not to be found in either memory or documents). The task was complicated by the fact that the missile had to be launched by its own engines. For this purpose the launch stand was raised to the upper section of the shaft. Rough aiming of the missile in azimuth was accomplished by turning the stand.

The extremely complicated scientific task of designing the control system was carried out by a collective under the guidance of Nikolay Alekseyevich Pilyugin, an associate of S. P. Korolev. In early 1955 the first launchings of the ballistic missile to be supplied to the navy were carried out at the Kapustin Yar test range. A little later its first launchings from a launcher installed in a mock-up of a submarine conning tower were carried out there. In September of the same year the world's first launching of a ballistic missile from the submarine "B-67" of the Northern Fleet under the command of Captain 2d Rank Fedor Ivanovich Kozlov (Captain Lieutenant Semen Fedorovich Bondin, commander of the missile department) was carried out. An R-11-FM missile with a range of up to 200 kilometers (it was then called a "surprise short-range" missile owing to its relatively short range and the impossibility of deflecting the blow) was fated to carry out a historical mission—to lay the foundation for establishment of Soviet submarine nuclear missile systems. This missile was designed through the joint effort of two outstanding scientists—missileman S. P. Korolev and ship builder N. N. Isanin.

The new equipment was studied—successfully I might emphasize—in the missile department of our submarine (commander, Captain Lieutenant Albert Vasilyevich Bardin) in parallel with learning its practical application. The gunnery experience Captain 2d Rank Kozlov's crew acquired in the Northern Fleet doubtlessly helped us in

many ways to solve these complex problems. Construction of a test range proceeded in parallel with mastering the equipment and the rules of fire. The main objective of the test range was to prepare and issue missiles to submarines, and to conduct test launchings. I as the commander was provided considerable assistance in preparing for these launchings by Vice Admiral Veniamin Andreyevich Sychev, chief of the sea-launched missile and artillery armament directorate. It must be said that considering the complexity of the latest missile weapon systems and the possibility submarines have for carrying out operational and tactical missions (and in the future, strategic) independently, fleet submarine forces and naval submarine forces (which existed until 1961) were established in 1956 as part of the navy's organizational structure. Submarines of the Pacific Fleet were under the command of an experienced, energetic submariner, Lev Petrovich Khiyaynen. It was under his leadership that the hard work of polishing missile launch organization at sea was started. The first missile was launched from our submarine on 6 September 1958 at 1232 Khabarovsk time, out of the forward shaft, to a range of 150 kilometers. On that same day, at 1618, a second missile launched from the aft shaft reached its destination successfully. Moreover the amount by which the missile missed the aiming point was minimal by even today's yardsticks.

But the main test of the entire crew of the submarine "B-62" still lay ahead. In late September 1959 Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev visited China in connection with the 10th anniversary of the People's Republic of China, and from there he went to Maritime Kray. On 4 October 1959 his IL-18 aircraft landed at the airport in Vladivostok. It stands to reason that the arrival of the head of party and government was illuminated then in detail in the press. Except for one episode that has a bearing upon our discussion here.

In the evening of 4 October I was ordered to begin loading two missiles onto the submarine and to be ready to launch, for which purpose a target area had to be organized on the water, with a large artillery target in its center (that is, at the aiming point). It became clear that they were intending to demonstrate the new weapon to Khrushchev. Anyone who has even casual knowledge of what it takes to receive and load missiles, to prepare for missile launchings and to carry them out, will of course understand how much work we had to do in a short time. We worked without sleep or rest, and it was not until 0800 on 6 October that the submarine "B-62" finally moored itself to the largest pier in the bay. From 0800 to 0900 preliminary calculations of the fire control data were carried out, the real time system was checked, two helicopters were transferred to the target area, and coastal theodolite stations were deployed to track the missile's warhead. In the morning of 6 October Khrushchev sailed into the bay aboard a destroyer under the command of Captain Lieutenant Mikhail Grigoryevich Putintsev (now a retired rear admiral), accompanied by naval commander-in-chief Admiral Sergey Georgiyevich

Gorshkov, Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Vitaliy Alekseyevich Fokin and other officials. A large diagram showing the submarine and missiles in cross section was posted on the pier where the submarine was moored. I reported the basic data of the submarine and the missile and its combat potentials when equipped with a nuclear warhead to the premier upon his arrival. Nikita Sergeyevich listened to me, and then he asked the following of the fleet commander:

"What is your schedule for the rest of day?" "Right now, combat training. Lunch at 1300," the commander replied. The time was 10:30.

"Well, all right. We'll set the launching for 1300 so as not to disturb the daily routine. And then we'll eat."

The crew had 2 hours and 30 minutes left. Of this amount, 1 hour was required to move at full speed to the submerging point, and then 1 hour and 30 minutes were left to maneuver to the firing course. But the problem was that because of imperfections in the course indication system, according to the Rocket Launching Regulations the firing course had to be maintained for not less than 4 hours without changing course, speed and running depth. I thought that some one of my chiefs would tell this to Nikita Sergeyevich, and that the launching would be postponed. But no one did this, and I then realized that there was nothing left to do but answer "Yes sir!" But our mood was spoiled: Both I and the commander of the gunnery department knew that the outcome of the launching might be quite unexpected. A decision was made after a short meeting: to carry out the first part of the assignment to the letter. The missile had to be launched at 1300, by the clock.

It was with a heavy heart that I gave the following command at the appointed time: "Permission to launch granted." Captain Lieutenant Bardinov pressed the launch button. A light signal on the console indicating that the missile was away lit up. In that same instant the missile's engine could be heard thundering over the smooth ocean surface. While the submarine was performing a "crash dive" I was able to persuade myself from watching the contrail through the periscope that the missile was on the calculated bearing. Khrushchev watched the launching from aboard the destroyer.

After surfacing, I saw from signal flags on the destroyer that the flagship was pleased with the actions of the submarine. Upon returning to our assigned pier in Vladivostok, we learned of an improbability of missile launchings: After separating from the missile, the nose section traveled the prescribed range of 180 km in freefall on a ballistic trajectory, striking the target and reducing it to splinters.

I was told that Nikita Sergeyevich was overjoyed by the result of the launching, and gave orders to award the submarine commander—that is, me—an early promotion, and to extend his gratefulness to the crew. The premier himself gave me the shoulder boards.

As far as I know, this was the first and last direct demonstration of the might of submarine ballistic missile weapons to the leader of the state.

FROM THE EDITOR. At the time that this article was being prepared for publication we received a telephone call from Captain 1st Rank (Retired) Fedor Ivanovich Kozlov. After graduating from the All-Union Naval Academy imeni Frunze he served in the Northern Fleet as the commander of the submarine "B-67," from which the first ballistic missile was launched. Fedor Ivanovich related that Sergey Pavlovich Korolev and Nikolay Nikitich Isanin were aboard the submarine at the time of the launching. In the final stage of the testing Korolev assumed a position in the conning tower at the commander's periscope, and gave commands that were relayed by the submarine commander. Immediately after receiving the report from the target area (it was on land) that deviation of the warhead from the aiming point was within normal limits, Sergey Pavlovich and Nikolay Nikitich sent a telegram to the leaders of the party and state on the successful testing of a new naval weapon.

To judge those distant events from the standpoint of the logic of the present warming of the international "climate" is probably not the historically correct thing to do: We have no need to rewrite the past. But we believe that there are generous lessons to be learned for future history. And one of them is that in those days, the state would not allow anyone to conduct a dialogue with it from a position of strength.

Controversy Over U.S.-Russian SSD Arms Agreement

Opposition Legislator Assails Pact

LD0212174392 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*
1508 GMT 2 Dec 92

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondents Lyudmila Yermakova and Yuriy Khots]

[Text] Moscow December 2 TASS—The oppositional "Russian Unity" bloc undertook an attempt to discredit President Boris Yeltsin on Wednesday by making public a dubious document which it said infringes on the state interests of Russia.

Lawmaker Mikhail Astafyev, a staunch opponent of Yeltsin, read out at a press conference what he said was an agreement between Russia and the United States "on safe and reliable methods of transporting, storing and eliminating [SSD] nuclear, chemical and other weapons and on averting their proliferation".

The agreement, which he said was signed by Presidents George Bush and Boris Yeltsin in Washington on June 17, 1992, allows U.S. envoys to take in and out of Russia any equipment without necessary customs checks. Russia thus becomes "an occupied territory", according to the lawmaker.

Astafyev said he had found the document in "an open envelope slipped under the door of his office", but added he is sure the agreement is authentic. He failed to give any other proof of the authenticity.

The "Russian Unity" bloc also promised that the main struggle at the current Congress of People's Deputies is still ahead and it will work hard to deny the post of prime minister to Yegor Gaydar.

Government Rejects Accusations

*LD0212183992 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1610 GMT 2 Dec 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow, 2 Dec—The Russian Federation Government's press office has refuted today's "sensation" from opposition spokesman Mikhail Astafyev, who at a news conference at the Kremlin accused President Yeltsin of not looking after Russia's state interests.

Mikhail Astafyev affirmed that in the agreement signed by Boris Yeltsin and George Bush on 17 June 1992 regarding the safe and reliable transportation, storage, and destruction [SSD] of weapons and the prevention of weapons proliferation, the U.S. spokesman was given the right unchecked, as if in "occupied territory," to infiltrate Russia and take any equipment in or out.

The press office's statement indicates that the agreement "does not lay on the Russian side any obligations going outside the framework of usual international practice, nor does it contain any one-sided obligations on the Russian side that would place it in an unequal position vis-a-vis the cosignatory."

The agreement, the statement by the press office says, "deals with the fact that one side gives the other rather expensive assistance, and free of charge at that, in eliminating nuclear, chemical, and other types of such weapons, and in the safe transportation and reliable storage of such weapons. In this situation it seems logical and right to provide certain conditions to the helping party which would create a favorable climate for rendering such assistance."

Spokesman Defends Accord

*OW0212205992 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1953 GMT 2 Dec 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The head of the foreign ministry's information department, Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, has described as legal incompetence the opposition allegations on

Wednesday saying there were imbalances in the Russian-US agreement on the safety of transporting, storing and destroying [SSD] nuclear weapons as well as on the prevention of nuclear proliferation.

Speaking during a break in the congressional session in Moscow, the leader of the opposition Russian Unity faction, Mikhail Astafyev, described the Moscow-Washington deal as an act of Russia's unilateral disarmament. He said that some of the agreement articles allowed US servicemen free access to any part of Russia or its installations.

On opposition charges that the agreement makes Russian territory prize open for the US personnel, Yastrzhembskiy said that "this totally false assertion indicates that the people who made it are either legally incompetent or cannot read what is written in black and white". That this question should be raised at all, he said, shows a lack of any sound argument by the opposition which will go to any limit to achieve its goals.

Government press officials also said the agreement did not bind Russia with any obligations outside the framework of international practices. A government statement released on Wednesday says there are no unilateral obligations putting Russia in a less favourable position than its counterpart.

Rossiyskoye Yedinstvo Group Criticizes Pact

*LD0312181392 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1604 GMT 3 Dec 92*

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondents Lyudmila Yermakova and Yuriy Khots]

[Text] Moscow December 3 ITAR-TASS—The Rossiyskoye Yedinstvo (Russian Unity) opposition bloc continues to insist that the agreement between Russia and the United States on safe and reliable transportation, storing and elimination [SSD] of weapons and prevention of their proliferation is tantamount to selling off Russia's interests. This was reiterated at a news conference held by the bloc here today.

On Wednesday [2 December] the Russian Government Press Centre said in a statement that the agreement signed by the presidents of the two countries did not transcend the confines of conventional international practice and contained no obligations tipping the scales in the United States favour. The agreement envisages that the United States will provide free assistance to Russia in eliminating nuclear and chemical weapons, Russia will in turn provide conditions for the United States which would create a favorable climate for this assistance.

Bloc representative Mikhail Astafyev said the explanation offered by the government press centre held no water.

Spokesman Calls Opposition 'Incompetent'

OW0312154692 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1458 GMT 3 Dec 92

[Report by diplomatic correspondents A. Borodin and D. Voskoboynikov; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The director of the press and information department of Russia's Foreign Ministry, Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, said that he views the statements by MP Mikhail Astafyev and some other opposition spokesmen as a show of "incompetence." These statements concern the Russian-American agreement signed to ensure safe and reliable transportation, storage and scrapping [SSD] of weaponry and prevent its proliferation. At a press conference held on December 3, some people's deputies from "Russian Unity" accused the country's leadership of having concluded a document that "unilaterally disarms Russia." The opposition, S. Yastrzhembskiy pointed out, "has simply cast prudence to the winds, for the lack of any weighty arguments in its struggle against the government of reformers." Here's what S. Yastrzhembskiy said in an interview with DP [Diplomatic Panorama]: "The agreement was signed in Washington on June 17 this year, and this is the only truth in the statements made by spokesmen of the unconstructive opposition. What is astonishing above all is the fact that they suddenly recalled an agreement that was signed six months ago and made public. The agreement was officially published in the collection of documents called "President B.N. Yeltsin's State Visit to the USA on June 16-18, 1992." It's hard to understand why they waited for half a year before they began to analyze an absolutely open document." Now let's review the opposition's arguments concerning the agreement.

Let's begin with the claim that the agreement leaves Russian territory wide open to the Americans. This claim is invalid; it shows only that those who resorted to it are not versed in legal matters. Under the agreement we help American government employees get entry visas, since we are interested in enabling them to join us in the efforts to scrap our stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and other weapons. However, the document does not specify that restrictions or bans on entry into "closed facilities" are cancelled for American specialists. Moreover, at the time the document was signed the rule on "closed areas" was in effect.

The opposition also maintains that Russia made unprecedented concessions and freed American specialists and contractors in advance from punishment for the possible damage done to Russia's property or for the death of Russian citizens. However there is nothing unprecedented in this. Such norms are included in many analogous international agreements. For example, the multilateral convention on aid in coping with accidents

involving radiation, which was signed in 1986 by the former USSR (as the successor state, Russia remains a signatory to the convention). The convention gives much greater privileges to the citizens of a third country that is helping Russia cope with the consequences of an accident involving radiation.

The voluntary and gratuitous nature of aid from a foreign country should be taken into account. The USA is to grant us (under the agreement in question) 400 million dollars for all these operations. With such extensive donations, the USA can hardly be expected to agree to bear responsibility for hypothetical damage to Russian property.

So, there is nothing sensational, secret or detrimental to Russia's interests in the agreement. Moreover, the agreement is truly helpful to us, considering our colossal financial and technical difficulties. We shall be able to buy with the money allocated by the USA, special railway cars and containers we simply do not have. We would have had to postpone the accomplishment of this task indefinitely without such technical and financial aid."

Parliamentary Committee Seeks To 'Edit' Agreement

OW0712201792 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1932 GMT 7 Dec 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The international affairs and foreign economic relations committee of the Russian Supreme Soviet expressed its wish to more concretely edit the unclear and ambiguous provisions of the Russian-American agreement dated June 17, 1992 with respect to the security and safe transfer, storage and destruction [SSD], and nonproliferation of the armaments. The draft conclusion developed by the committee contains this wish.

The other says the above mentioned document was the cause of accusations of "a unilateral disarmament of Russia" on the part of the parliamentary opposition. The conclusion was composed on the request of a group of the people's deputies who believe that the agreement grants unilateral advantages to the American side and inflicts damage to the interests and sovereignty of Russia.

The draft conclusion points out that separate provisions of the agreement under consideration have general character and have a nonprecise wording. The document states that this creates certain ambiguities and grounds for abusing on the part of the American side. In particular, the committee believes that one of the articles contains an unclear provision stating that the Russian Federation refuses beforehand from any claims towards the American party if the U.S. actions concerning realization of the agreement lead to the damage of the Russian inventory and ruin of the Russian staff.

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

More on Kokoshin Rezhitsa Remarks on Missile Forces' Future

934P0022A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 Nov 92 pp 1-2

[Article by Pavel Felgengauer: "Russia Will Have To Build Its Defense on Strategic Nuclear Weapons: This is the Most Efficient Part of the Russian Army"]

[Text] No, there are probably no more peaceful-looking military installations on Earth than the positions that are ready for immediate launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Everything is hidden underground as much as possible; there are no people to be seen; and in general everything is still. Incidentally, it is a special occasion when the high commanders come "to the site." Even in the RVSN (Strategic Missile Forces).

First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Andrey Kokoshin has been dealing for a long time with questions of the nuclear-strategic balance and the development of nuclear systems (the "asymmetric" response to Reagan's SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative], the model of strategic stability, etc.), but he visited the strategic missile forces at their actual operational combat positions for the first time on 11 November of this year. Actually, he did not have far to go: At one time the strategic missiles were spread fairly uniformly throughout the territory of the former Union, including in the vicinity of Moscow, among the forests, lakes, and marshes of the Valday Hills around the Bologoye Station (the word "vicinity" must be understood quite broadly here).

The Rezhitsa Division of the strategic missile forces previously consisted of 11 regiments (each missile regiment has 10 silo launchers). There are now four MRUR 100 (also known as SS-17 and RS-16) missile regiments left. The "One Hundred" is a two-stage liquid-propellant missile of the latest generation with engines of the "Glushko system" which are approximately 20 meters long. The range is 10,000 km and it has four warheads with a capacity of several hundred kilotonnes and a "throw-weight" of 2.55 tonnes. The latest modifications were put into a state of operational readiness in 1979. The MRUR-100 missiles were deployed only in the European part of the country.

The remaining regiments of the division were removed from operational readiness and the ballistic missiles were eliminated (the period of their guaranteed operation had expired anyway). The first experiments in destroying silo launchers through targeted explosions were also conducted in the Rezhitsa Division. Incidentally, the last four regiments will soon be removed from the state of operational readiness, and there are no more MRUR 100 missiles left in the strategic missile forces.

In spite of the strategic disarmament that has begun, strategic missile forces units are maintaining a high level of combat readiness, which distinguishes them from

many other kinds of armed forces. A sufficient number of recruits are sent to strategic missile forces (the staffing level is 70 percent, and in certain key subdivisions—98 percent). One of the officers of the mobile command point of the Rezhitsa Division noted: "We talk a lot about the fact that we might soon have to perform the duties of enlisted men and noncommissioned officers, but in reality we have not reached that point yet." (Approximately 10 percent of the armed forces personnel serve in strategic missile forces.)

Infantry forces are experiencing difficult times now. Many units of various sizes are completely disorganized as a result of the accelerated relocation from nearby to faraway foreign countries and also because of the catastrophic personnel shortage. The most combat-ready paratroopers have already been "sent into battle" in numerous peacekeeping operations. The Air Force does not have enough aircraft fuel and therefore there are not enough flights, which reduces the combat readiness of the flight personnel. Moreover, a considerable number of the modern aircraft, especially in strategic and transport aviation, "were left" in Ukraine. A considerable number of the combat ships of the Navy are docked at the bases because of the shortage of fuel and the serious understaffing with seamen on active duty. What has remained "functional" has been used mainly to ensure the combat stability and safety of the naval part of the strategic triad under the conditions of the complete dominance of the American fleet in all open seas. Russian (Soviet) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines are more vulnerable than the American ones in terms of a number of parameters (they make more noise) and therefore a considerable part of the submarine fleet and multipurpose submarines have been deployed to cover the region of SSBN [nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines] combat patrol. This task, in the opinion of the Naval Command, is being carried out with a great deal of difficulty.

The nuclear missile forces have remained essentially the only effective guarantee of real strategic independence of the Russian Federation. Of course, the nuclear missile forces are quite useless in warding off regional "domestic" conflicts, but the threat of the use of even an insignificant part of the currently existing nuclear arsenal would obviously be quite sufficient to keep, say, our southern neighbors of the former Union from possible serious intervention in the Transcaucasus or Central Asia. Or to prevent the deployment of foreign peacekeeping forces—as occurred, for example, in Yugoslavia—on the territories of the former USSR where their appearance might run counter to the state interests of Russia. (The nuclear "umbrella" of strategic nuclear forces provides for the security and territorial integrity not only of Russia itself but also of its allies who have signed the collective security agreement—for example, Armenia.)

But nuclear deterrence can prevent war only as long as there is a serious belief that arms of mass destruction will actually be put to use if other means of deterrence turn out to be ineffective. But with the end of the global

confrontation between East and West, the previous precise definition of the nuclear *casus belli* has become more vague. There is an ever-increasing probability that sooner or later some medium-sized or even small non-nuclear state will challenge one of the nuclear powers, and the latter will be left with no choice but a "limited" nuclear strike. This pertains particularly to Russia in these difficult times.

Of course, the official defense doctrine (or what takes its place in Russia today—"basic doctrinal points") permits the use of nuclear weapons only as a "retaliatory" measure. But it has already been quite officially recognized that an attack on certain key objects, say, nuclear reactors, counts as a "first" nuclear strike. There are many nuclear and other strategically important objects on the territory of the former USSR. Including near the hotbeds of ethnic conflicts (for example, the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant). Incidentally, in their fervor over possible future military actions, people will most likely forget about the fine points of the fulfillment of doctrinal principles, especially if the threat of nuclear disaster becomes quite real.

At the time when there were more than 60,000 combat-ready nuclear warheads in operational readiness (in the hands of the troops), the idea of a "limited" nuclear war seemed quite unrealistic. Now, as more and more nuclear warheads are removed from a state of operational readiness, the probability of a limited nuclear conflict increases as well. And the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence decreases correspondingly as the danger of a global, apocalyptic nuclear catastrophe recedes into the distance. Nuclear weapons become not so much weapons for prevention of war ("doomsday" weapons) as simply weapons which are very powerful and effective.

But it seems that Russia during the past decade (at least during the entire time of military reform) has had no real alternative. Strategic nuclear forces, and particularly their most powerful, inexpensive, and reliable component—nuclear missile forces—continue to be the basis of our national security. Incidentally, the nuclear missile forces have considerable problems as well. Forces of this kind are in need of fundamental modernization, both technologically and politically.

All the multiple-unit, liquid-propellant strategic missiles—the SS-19, the "heavy" SS-18, and the new solid-fuel mobile SS-24—will have to be eliminated before the year 2004 in keeping with the new "framework" agreement on strategic weapons, on the basis of which the START-II agreement is now being prepared. Incidentally, it is not just a matter of a new agreement. Missiles with the engines developed by Academician Glushko were distinguished by their large capacity and reliability, and they were relatively inexpensive. But heptyl—the fuel used by these missiles—is an extremely toxic and dangerous substance. Heptyl is somewhat less toxic than modern chemical warfare agents but it is chemically unstable. Moreover, accidents with heptyl could in principle lead to steady pollution of the environment (water

and air). And the overall "reserves" of heptyl on the territory of the former Union, it seems, even exceed the reserves of toxic substances for chemical warfare (more than 50,000 tonnes).

The division commander of the Rezhitsa Division, Major General Aleksandr Gribov, assured our NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent that "there had been no accidents with heptyl in his division because of the good training of the personnel." But there have been accidents involving heptyl in the strategic missile forces. As, incidentally, there have been in the Navy, where several SSBN's are still armed with liquid-propellant ballistic missiles, which is insane from an ecological standpoint. There have also been accidents in air defense, especially when the anti-aircraft positions of the renowned S-75 liquid-propellant missiles came under fire from enemy aircraft in Vietnam and the Near East.

We have not yet developed a reliable method of salvaging heptyl. But, as Andrey Kokoshin told our NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent, Russian and Ukrainian chemists are working intensively on various possibilities. They might possibly begin a joint Russian-Ukrainian program for the heptyl problem. (There are approximately 130 SS-19 liquid-propellant missiles deployed on the territory of Ukraine. Each contains 30 tonnes of heptyl.)

But even with the fuel emptied out, a liquid-propellant missile is fairly dangerous since a tonne or two of heptyl remains in the pipeline of the engine and the cooling system. The missile must also be deactivated in a special device before it is destroyed. And the two existing plants for eliminating strategic missiles "have been left" in nearby foreign countries: Belarus (Brest Oblast) and Ukraine (Rovno Oblast).

The "idea" frequently expressed in the press that the old ballistic missiles could be salvaged by using them to launch commercial satellites, unfortunately, is completely unrealistic. To conduct commercial launches from existing silos (where the missiles are now located) is intolerable both from the standpoint of ecological safety and for a number of other, purely technical reasons. And to take the missiles out and take them to Plesetsk or Tyuratay (Baykonur) and then to pour fuel in them again would be dangerous and expensive. And there is not likely to be a serious space agency that would risk an expensive (in the direct sense of the word) satellite by launching it with an inexpensive but old and ecologically dangerous Russian missile when the world has a surplus of specialized, reliable, and relatively safe carriers that are used purely for space, including Russian ones.

The only one of today's SSBN's that is "permitted" according to START-II is the Topol land-based mobile missile (SS-25)—a single-unit (several hundred kilotonnes) solid-fuel missile with a range of 11,000 km. The overall weight of the system is 40 tonnes. The Topol is still being produced at the Votkinsk machine plant. The system is

almost 100 percent Russian. Only the chassis is produced in Belarus under an intergovernmental agreement.

The Topol missile division now deployed in Belarus (72 missiles) will probably be relocated to Valday, the base of the Rezhitsa Division, although the marshy hills are not very convenient for maneuvering mobile missiles.

Moreover, mobile missiles are potentially more vulnerable to possible "nuclear" terrorists than silos. Obviously, in the next century we will also need a new silo-launched single-unit solid-fuel missile. Incidentally, no final decision has been made regarding the future composition of the strategic triad.

The discussion of the future grouping of the strategic forces is one of the reasons why on his inspection trip to the Rezhitsa Division Andrey Kokoshin was accompanied by: the deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and Security, Aleksandr Piskunov; the chief of weapons of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Colonel General Vyacheslav Mironov, (army arms specialists work directly with the military-industrial complex); the new commander in chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel General Igor Sergeyev (more than 30 years of service in missile forces, responsible for implementation of the program for an "asymmetrical" response to the SDI); the deputy commander in chief (arms specialist), Colonel General Aleksandr Ryazhskikh, and many other generals. One of the officers of the division's mobile command point said that "never in his life had he seen so many generals at one time."

Andrey Kokoshin and Igor Sergeyev went down to the underground regimental command point which is located inside another narrow and deep concrete silo. (All the silos were originally dug out and lined with concrete by hand by military construction workers. Out of considerations of concealment and secrecy. So that the enemy would not be able to guess the amount of equipment accumulated there.) Two people at a time are on duty at the command point, for 12 hours in a row. The rest of the shift rests in the "hold" of the command point. The watch lasts three to four days. (American strategic missile forces also have two people on duty at a time, but for eight hours. And they do not lock them up underground for three or four days—they let them go home as soon as they are off duty.)

In principle, a military launch is carried out directly "from Moscow." Operators in the silo merely repeat the commands. But if the automated system fails, the launch can be done "manually," even if the external power supply is cut off (the element base of the special communications systems and the electronic equipment of the strategic missile forces are several decades behind the times). True, an independent launch could be conducted only after receiving permission from the center. Incidentally, in all the history of strategic missile forces there has not been a single case of an attempt to launch a missile independently.

There are several lines of security surrounding the missile regiment. Barbed wire, a high-voltage fence, mines, and firing points. And even after one arrives at the missile positions, it is practically impossible to find the silo and "pluck out" the nuclear weapon. So all is well in the strategic missile forces. One can sleep peacefully.

Andrey Kokoshin: "Taking into account the role the missile forces play in the country's defense and our present economic situation, we are striving to reduce the number of types of ballistic missiles in our arsenal. Thus we are working particularly intensively on problems of standardization of missile equipment for both mobile and stationary missile complexes. Additionally, we are looking from a completely different position at the problem of providing the necessary level of nuclear safety and operational reliability of missile weapons. The final decisions have not been made yet; we are looking thoroughly into a number of alternatives. But even now one can say that in terms of the aforementioned qualities, the next generation of nuclear weapons will be essentially updated and standardized."

Wisdom of Framework Agreement Questioned

PM2711110792 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
26 Nov 92 p 7

[Vladimir Potapov article: "No Point in Deluding Ourselves"]

[Text] With the election of a new White House incumbent, the quest for new approaches to military programs has also begun across the ocean. The "Cold War" victory won by Washington strategists actually turned out to be pyrrhic. The collapse of the Union announced in Washington destabilized the situation in the world. Today's reality demands different concepts, which at the same time are less burdensome.

According to the initial outlines, the future American programs are more pragmatic—they envisage a curtailment of appropriations for the costly SDI program and a freeze on the construction of a land-based ABM complex. The United States will concentrate on developing a new generation of high-precision weapons, but does not intend to abandon its traditional nuclear triad.

G. Bush's legacy in the disarmament sphere will remain a painful problem for the U.S. Democrats. Why? The Russian Supreme Soviet recently ratified the Treaty Between the USSR and the United States on Reducing and Limiting Strategic Offensive Weapons. It was signed back on 31 July 1991 in Moscow.

Moscow has approved the treaty. Washington has not. And the reason for this is that Moscow's approval is no longer sufficient to bring the treaty into force. It is also necessary to reach an understanding with Kiev, Minsk, and Alma-Ata. And today, clearly, these new nuclear powers may begin to assert their identity. This is already being done by Ukraine, which has 176 strategic nuclear missiles on its territory. In order to solve its current

problems the Kiev leadership wants to obtain something concrete in return for its participation in disarmament. The spinelessness of the Bush administration's old Soviet partners could now cost both Washington and Moscow dear. Unconditional capitulation is dangerous for the victor too.

In Washington, it seems, people have now sensed that they were caught in a trap of dialogue conducted on their own terms. They are preparing for changes. Only time will tell what kind. But as a start it has been announced that U.S. Ambassador in Moscow R. Strauss will not be returning to his post from home.

Meanwhile in the fatherland it is now clear to many that Gorbachev's presidential regime laid the foundations and in many ways prepared the actions of the second echelon of "new politicians." Of course, Soviet military might, which formerly enjoyed parity with U.S. military might, has not been overlooked. The treaty just ratified by Russia essentially set the direction of disarmament cuts and the tone of the demands being made on us. This philosophy of "disarming at any price" originates from the permanent cohort of titled advisers to the Kremlin incumbents of recent years

The current START Treaty is designed to be the forerunner and starting point of the so-called framework agreement on deep cuts in Russian and U.S. strategic offensive weapons signed during the Washington meeting between B. Yeltsin and G. Bush on 17 June.

Since the problems with Gorbachev's treaty were settled, Yeltsin's accord has been coming to the fore. However, from the moment it was signed in Russia there have been constant voices warning that the road of disarmament outlined in it is unacceptable to us from the viewpoint of both the economy and our security. I will mention just a few arguments.

The United States is showing no desire to bind itself, as the Soviet Union did back in 1982, by a promise not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. State-of-the-art weaponry is continuing to be developed intensively and without any limits across the ocean. Test explosions are being carried out, and against their background all peace-loving exhortations are just a bluff. And in view of the new trends toward making economies in the United States, we may be given nothing in return for disarming, contrary to the hopes of certain people in our country. Ukraine has run up against precisely this today.

Implementation of the framework agreement reductions will leave Russia with its mobile—railroad and dirt road [gruntovoy]—nuclear complexes as the main component of strategic might. Many of our experts believe that these mobile systems will turn Russia into a hostage of itself. Their reasoning? It is not for nothing, they claim, that the United States has refrained from creating such systems of its own. It is because of their deficiencies in terms of survivability and security. On the contrary, by organizing "information leaks," they did their utmost to push us onto this dead-end road.

Our own experience of possessing such weapons merely confirms this bitter conclusion. The incidence of accidental malfunctions and the threat of sabotage to the lines of communication of mobile systems have increased in the situation now prevailing. Terrible weapons are stuck out in the open near population centers... It is no secret what may result from this. Chernobyl, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki pale beside this prospect. I think that people in Washington are also beginning to realize that they may have been overzealous. The consequences of this wholly realistic catastrophe would be global.

But our "framework agreement" disarmers brush aside these "details" and point to the Navy and Air Force warheads which we are also being left with. This is not reassuring—rather it is even more alarming. Our naval ships are already veterans. There is hardly a sign of life in the shipyards where submarines are built. And new bombers have been taken out of production altogether. Upon completion of the framework agreement cuts we will be left with a heap of scrap metal.

And what does the framework agreement that is being foisted upon us cut? First and foremost, MIRVed land-based nuclear missiles. These missiles, in the view of the Americans themselves, constitute our only current system with any promise.

There is still an alternative to this scenario. It consists in the need to examine afresh the framework agreements, the pseudo-parity linkages, and the whole disarmament concept. Rather than heeding somebody else's prompting, we ourselves must decide which complexes we should be left with to develop. And how we should disarm and at what pace. And we should rely more on practical experts rather than on armchair politicians in elaborating our strategic military concepts.

There is no point in deluding ourselves. It was not for nothing that Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin broached the subject of the framework agreement in his first telephone conversation with U.S. President-elect B. Clinton. I do not know whether this pleased his interlocutor. In the nuclear age it is extremely risky for strategists to play with loaded dice. They are already beginning to suspect this in Washington. But what about us?

Belarusian Consideration of START Treaty

U.S. Senators Discuss Issue

934P0024A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 26 Nov 92 p 1

[Article by Igor Sinyakevich: "Nuclear Disarmament: Free of Charge or for a Fee? Belarusian Leaders Are Not of the Same Mind on This"]

[Text] American Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, authors of the well-known amendment on the Soviet nuclear threat, paid a short visit to Minsk along with five disarmament experts. They met with Chairman

of the Belarus Supreme Soviet Stanislav Shushkevich, Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich, Minister of Defense Pavel Kozlovskiy, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Petr Kravchenko. The nuclear weapons situation was the main subject of talks.

Lugar stated: "We discussed issues of assisting Belarus in the prompt and safe elimination of nuclear weapons. We would like to provide comprehensive support to you." In the words of the senators, they were offered assurances by the Belarusian leadership that the START treaty and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty would be ratified by the republic's parliament within weeks. The American guests noted: "This is precisely what we wanted to hear." The senators expressed their concern over the existing danger of leaks of nuclear raw materials and technology, and promised to facilitate their prevention. In their words, their country is prepared to work on the development of joint technologies that will help provide work for scientists and servicemen who have advanced skills in the nuclear area. Responding to a question from a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent on whether differences in the approach of the Belarusian leaders to the problem of nuclear weapons had become apparent, Lugar noted: "Both leaders firmly assured us that they are not planning for nuclear weapons here. We heard the same from the ministers of defense and foreign affairs."

At the same time, certain circumstances give grounds to refer to the existence of differences between Vyacheslav Kebich and Stanislav Shushkevich. At any rate, after the talks the prime minister stated that he was happy with Mr. Lugar's words concerning the need to share equally in all proceeds from the elimination of nuclear weapons. Even earlier the Government of Belarus unofficially expressed its concern with the fact that proceeds from the sale of uranium, received as a result of the disposal of nuclear missiles, go exclusively to Russia. At the same time, Stanislav Shushkevich repeated his previous statements as he talked to journalists. Referring to his expertise (he is a former chairman of the department of nuclear physics), the speaker stated that there can be no profits from the elimination nuclear weapons. On top of everything, Shushkevich quoted the words of Kisa Vorobyandinov: "It is improper to haggle in this matter."

With regard to the nuclear weapons situation as a whole, the head of the republic stated: "The nuclear forces on the territory of Belarus are Russian; they are under the jurisdiction of Moscow, and the issue of our nuclear disarmament comes down to the withdrawal of these troops to the territory of Russia." In Shushkevich's words, it is necessary to create good conditions for withdrawing these troops and settling the people at new locations, especially taking into account the not quite fortunate experience in withdrawing troops from Germany and Poland. The speaker stated that he counts on assistance in this matter from America and Europe "because everybody is interested in the creation of a nuclear-free zone here."

Therefore, the position of Belarus in the area of nuclear disarmament turned out to be softer than that of Ukraine or Kazakhstan. At the same time, there are differences in approach within the Belarusian leadership itself. Shushkevich strives to get rid of the "nuclear club" as quickly and "unselfishly" as possible, whereas Kebich and the government are inclined to turn nuclear disarmament into a subject for haggling.

Parliamentary Defense Committee Chairman Comments

*LD0112144492 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1343 GMT 1 Dec 92*

[By BELINFORM correspondent Natalya Sverjunova for TASS]

[Text] Minsk December 1 TASS—Belarus hopes to become nuclear-free by the end of 1994, according to the chairman of the Republican Parliamentary Commission on Security and Defence.

Upon agreement with the Russian leadership Belarus plans to transfer 81 intercontinental missiles to Russia by December 30, 1994, Yuriy Popov told the "MIN-SKAYA PRAVDA" newspaper on Tuesday.

He recalled that in order to acquire the nuclear-free status as soon as possible and avert possible nuclear proliferation, Belarus voluntarily undertook an unprecedented step and transferred offensive strategic arms deployed on its territory under the Russian jurisdiction.

Nuclear disarmament is a part of the general military reform in the former Soviet republic which also intends to cut the personnel of its Armed Forces to not more than 100,000 men, Popov said.

New Chief of Strategic Rocket Troops Describes Tasks

*LD2811145492 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1200 GMT 28 Nov 92*

[Text] On the air now is a program of the "Radar" studio "The Armed Forces and Society." At the microphone is journalist Igor Karandov:

[Karandov] Hello. Despite the end of the cold war we cannot at present say that the threat to the peace and security of our country on a global scale does not exist. A mountain of armaments, including nuclear weapons, has been accumulated in the world which, incidentally, despite reductions, are being constantly perfected. The reality of the presence of powerful combat-ready armies remains. This in itself constitutes a threat to peace.

The possibility of a confrontation between groups of states and individual countries, including the nuclear powers, has still not been completely ruled out. In this connection, the security of our country will in many ways depend on the state of the Armed Forces and our nuclear potential, where the strategic rocket troops have a leading role.

Recently, by decree of the Russian president, Colonel General Igor Dmitriyevich Sergeyev was appointed commander in chief of the Strategic Rocket Troops. In

connection with this I asked him to tell us what questions he, as commander in chief, will be tackling in the first instance.

[Begin Sergeyev recording] Well, first and foremost, clearly those that would enable the strategic rocket troops of the Russian Federation to solve the tasks entrusted to them in the overall system of combat readiness of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, taking into consideration the changing conditions that occur in various spheres of the life of our country, the rebirth of Russia, and in the political, economic, and social spheres and many others which, in one way or another, are reflected in the Strategic Rocket Troops.

But, first and foremost, clearly there are questions that lie in the sphere of armaments and military equipment. As far as the personnel are concerned, the rocket troops, here it is the individual who stands at the head of all our problems. And the main tasks of the command of the rocket troops and, to a varying degree, the commanders and leaders, is to be closer to the officer corps and the men, to live their hopes and aspirations and anxieties, and to tackle these questions in a timely way.

To achieve this new forms and methods of work need to be sought. Generally speaking, this is not a new challenge, but one would like to tackle it in a new way, and to find in practical terms opportunities of solving questions. Any weakening of the rocket troops as a basic integral part of the strategic nuclear forces is, in my view, absolutely impermissible, in no conditions; the state and the people will not permit this. Of course, in entering into accords with the nuclear club and jointly lowering the nuclear threshold, one must maintain in equal measure the levels of combat readiness which have ensured stability in the world in the historic past and still do today.

The system of ensuring nuclear security, which exists and which has been developed over decades, will continue to be a guarantee of our security in present-day conditions, too. Such a system of work operates, in my view, in a reliable way. [end recording]

Ukraine's Kravchuk on Compensation for ICBM's, Targeting

*PM0112143892 Milan PANORAMA in Italian
29 Nov 92 pp 92, 93*

[Interview with President Leonid Kravchuk by Alvaro Ranzoni; place and date not given]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Ranzoni] How many nuclear warheads do you have in Ukraine?

[Kravchuk] The thousand or so tactical nuclear warheads, including those of the Black Sea Fleet, were already removed six months ago. The strategic ones remain.

[Ranzoni] How many in all?

[Kravchuk] There are 176 missiles, 46 of which have 12 warheads each. We can say an average of eight warheads per missile, making a total of about 1,400 devices.

[Ranzoni] Why have none of these been dismantled yet?

[Kravchuk] Ukraine has not yet ratified the START agreement.

[Ranzoni] Do you want to ratify it?

[Kravchuk] Yes, but we are asking for compensation. We transferred the tactical warheads to Russia to be dismantled, but we did not get one dollar from the sale of the nuclear material which was recycled and allocated to other uses. Now we have to buy nuclear fuel for our power stations from Russia. We do not want this to happen again with the strategic warheads. Just the cost of removing these missiles is enormous.

[Ranzoni] Who should pay?

[Kravchuk] Russia and the United States have an agreement for the sale and recycling of fissile material. We want America to buy from us as well.

[Ranzoni] Who are these 176 missiles aimed at today?

[Kravchuk] Still at the United States and the NATO countries. But now I am able, from a juridical and administrative point of view, to prevent the Ukrainian missiles from being launched, even if Yeltsin and General Shaposhnikov, commander of the CIS strategic forces, wanted to push their button in Moscow. [passage omitted]

Navy Denies Pacific Fleet Has 'New Ballistic Missiles'

*PM0212155792 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 1 Dec 92 p 2*

[Unattributed report: "Report on New Ballistic Missiles Greatly Exaggerated"]

[Text] The report published in a number of media organs to the effect that the Pacific Fleet has successfully assimilated some new ballistic missiles is untrue, the Navy commander in chief's press group has announced. The Pacific Fleet has received no new types of ballistic missiles, except for the strategic missiles that are already on the submarines.

In fact, in September the guided missile cruiser Chervona Ukraina and two nuclear submarines, in accordance with the combat training plan, jointly fired at a marine target using antiship missiles which they had had in their armament for a long time.

**Ukrainian Parliamentarian Sees START
Ratification 'in Near Future'***OW0212214492 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1955 GMT 2 Dec 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Excerpts] During his meeting with the ambassador of Luxembourg, Jean Oster, on Wednesday in Kiev, the first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, Vasiliy Durdinets, declared that the further staying of Ukraine in the CIS depends on the effectiveness of the Commonwealth. [passage omitted]

Durdinets expressed his opinion that in the near future Ukraine's parliament would ratify the Strategic Arms Reduction [START] Treaty and the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons.

**Further on Use of SS-25 ICBMs for Space
Launches***934P0027A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Dec 92 p 4*

[Article by Mikhail Rebrov: "Project 'Start-1': The Cosmos and Profit—Compatible Concepts"]

[Text] The SS-25 strategic system requires no introduction. The solid-propellant rocket can carry a nuclear charge beneath its nose cone. It can be delivered over an enormous distance, and with the greatest accuracy. It appears in the "table of ranks" as a menacing offensive weapon. Let me add that in its class, it is the best in the world. By the way, all verbs should now be written in past tense.

No, I am not about to bring up the topic: "If we beat them into plowshares, what will we fight with?" They are now obsolete. And that's just as well. I am troubled by something else: In the first variant of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty all SS-25s taken off alert status were subject to destruction. If you think about it, that would have placed progressive engineering ideas, developed technology and production experience "under the knife." However, luckily fate had something different planned. Reason triumphed, and the final version of the treaty allows us to keep intact that part of the missile system that is not considered to be a strategic weapon. It was at this point that the idea came up to create a space vehicle out of the SS-25 that could insert commercial satellites into orbit. Besides everything else, the project, which came to be called "Start-1," made it possible to retain highly qualified personnel in defense plants and design offices, to solve the employment problem, and to carry out the tasks of conversion extremely effectively.

Such is the prehistory of the project. The history of it itself began over 3 years ago, and it began with a misunderstanding, or a reluctance to understand. Two former prime ministers (Ryzhkov and Pavlov) refused the request of "suplicants" for capital investments, even though the "Start-1" project promised not only to

pay its way but also to make a profit. Now about the "suplicants." These are not adventuristic organizations with a dilettante's understanding of the problem, but substantial firms: the plant that manufactured the SS-25s, the "Kompleks" Scientific and Technical Center, the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering, the I.V.K. Joint-Stock Company (it is investing in development), the Barrikady Plant and a precision instrument design office. Understanding came after the August events of last year, the project reached the point of transition "from an idea to introduction," the date of the first launch was scheduled for December (Plesetsk Cosmodrome), and commercial operation is to begin in 1993.

What is the "Start-1" space rocket system? Let me repeat that it is based on a modernized offensive SS-25 missile (a fourth stage has been added to it, such that its total length is 22 m), the "wheeled chassis" of which was replaced by a special transporting platform. The delivery vehicle is assembled completely at the plant, inserted in a launch container and delivered to the launch site by rail, by airplane, or by a seagoing or river vessel. The payload may be inserted into the prescribed orbit directly, or it may be placed in an intermediate orbit, after which the spacecraft's own propulsion unit takes it into its precise orbit. The weight of the payload is 550 kg, and its overall dimensions are 1.3 cubic meters. The range of altitudes of polar circular orbits is up to 700 km.

Specialists distinguish five basic criteria characterizing "Start-1": design simplicity, high reliability (let me note: Several dozen SS-25 missiles were destroyed by launching them, and not one of them failed), convenient transportability, the possibility of launching from any region (from equatorial and northern latitudes, from the ocean shore, and so on), and insertion of satellites into orbits with different inclination planes. We can add to this that the new space rocket system makes COCOM restrictions irrelevant.

Since the project is a commercial one, I attempted to get more complete information on this side of the matter. Here is what I was told by I.V.K. vice president S. M. Zinchenko:

"We found the idea itself of the defense specialists attractive: It was interesting in engineering respects, and highly promising. Analysis of the international space market shows that on the order of 300 satellites built on behalf of different countries are in a sense waiting their turn for a delivery vehicle. The freight charges are high, which is why interested companies seek advantageous partners. Use of "Start-1" will cost a client approximately 10 times less, if we consider market prices. No, this is not a case of dumping—it is one of the advantages of its design. Our hope is that our project will attract the interest of the Americans. They came up with the Iridium communications system, which will require the launching of 77 satellites.

"As far as the future is concerned, Russia's participation in the Iridium program will open up a road for us into

the world information and communication system. Moreover the "Start-1" project is only the beginning, one which may be followed by an extremely effective continuation."

I also learned from this interview that the project (one of the documents pertaining to its implementation, No 1521-r, was signed by Ye. T. Gaydar on 19 August of this year) does not require a single kopeck out of the state budget. Moreover 20 percent of the profit goes into the state coffers. The creators of the system and its investors are not looking at just the foreign market alone. They are hoping primarily for orders from inside the country. After all, there are many scientific centers in the CIS that are interested in inexpensive satellites for various sorts of research and ecological monitoring.

Such in brief is the "Start-1" project. Need I say more? Apparently yes, since certain questions may arise. The first one is this: "Is space now a realm of private enterprise?" Yes, and this is its first shoot. But rather than the "private," I personally prefer another word—"commercial." It is time for us to realize that "cosmos" and "profit" are compatible concepts. That conversion presupposes not only "dismantling," but also creation, and effective use of new products. Another question is this: "Won't our advanced technologies drift away across the border, and won't they be used over there for military purposes (for example, in SDI)?" Clear legal groundwork and monitoring are important here. However, I believe that all of these problems are soluble. And in the meantime, "Start" is approaching the start line.

Submarine-Launched Missile To Create 'Pure Interferon'

LD0612235492 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 2100 GMT 6 Dec 92

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Mankind may soon find a cure for such diseases as cancer and AIDS, and this will be helped by super-pure interferon. This substance with high-immune properties can be created only in zero gravity conditions. And on Monday, 7 December, for the first time in the world, Russia will conduct an experiment to obtain this interferon. A rocket due for destruction will be launched from a submarine in the Pacific Fleet in the Far East. The rocket is as a rule in a zero gravity situation for several minutes, and pure interferon will be produced during that time. We were told by (Levshin), chief specialist of the Navy for rocket and artillery armaments, that the rocket is equipped with a research unit which will later, by analogy with spaceships, descend by parachute to Earth. If all goes well, the profit from the experiment will go to make up for the expenditure on the destruction of obsolete weapons per the conversion plan.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Russia Names Zvedre as SSC Deputy Representative

PM3011163792 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 28 Nov 92 p 1

[Unattributed "Appointment" report]

[Text] A Russian Federation Government resolution has appointed Yevgeniy Zvedre Russian Federation deputy representative on the Standing Consultative Commission [SSC] To Promote Implementation of the Aims and Provisions of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems.

In conversation with a ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent, Yevgeniy Zvedre said, in particular, that the Standing Consultative Commission, in implementing the aims and provisions of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM systems, deals with specific questions of treaty implementation, including juridical, political, and military tasks. There are monitoring bodies for all treaties in the Standing Consultative Commission system. They are responsible for the implementation of its terms. As for Russia's position, Yevgeniy Zvedre stressed, it is that the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems creates the foundation for maintaining strategic stability. This line is pursued both with the Americans and with the rightful heirs of the former USSR. Specific confirmation of this is the fact a decision was made and signed in Bishkek to the effect that the CIS countries pledge to support the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems and implement it. So, a new mechanism has been created for the implementation and operation of the treaty in the new political conditions, Yevgeniy Zvedre said in conclusion.

According to our information, Yevgeniy Konstantinovich Zvedre was born in Grodno in 1948. He is a graduate of the Institute of International Relations Department of International Relations. He speaks English, French, and Burmese. He worked at the USSR Embassy in Burma for more than 10 years as the second secretary. Since 1984, he has been in the Foreign Ministry central apparatus, working as first secretary of the Russian Foreign Ministry Department for Disarmament and Military Technology Monitoring.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

'Qualitatively New' Russian Army Said Taking Shape

PM0212153592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 21 Nov 92 p1

[Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel Anatoliy Dokuchayev article: "Russia's Military Might Will Be Appropriate to the Real Level of Military Danger"]

[Text] As one military expert graphically put it six months ago, the Russian Army today is the USSR Armed

Forces, only without its arms, legs, and other vital organs, which the former Soviet republics have lopped off in the course of achieving sovereignty. It was hard not to agree with him. Units and formations of border districts have passed to Ukraine, Belarus, and some other states. The Russian Army has seen not only quantitative changes (there is no problem with that, because Russia has more troops than it needs and cuts are due) but also qualitative changes—and not for the better.

Take the once-powerful and modern missile and space defense complex, the pride of the country. It used to make a weighty contribution to maintaining stability on a global level. But now? Baykonur and stations monitoring outer space and providing early warning of a missile attack are outside Russia's borders. And what about our air defense system? In the days of the USSR, the gathering of data for analysis of the situation in the air began on the territory of East European countries. Nowadays Russian radar "scans" the skies from the border: Pskov, Smolensk, Kursk, Rostov....

As Major General Gennadiy Ivanov, chief of the Military Building and Reforms Directorate, said at a news conference recently, the task of thoroughly reforming the Armed Forces is just one of many facing the Russian Defense Ministry. It also has to form the Russian Army, ensure the systematic withdrawal of troops to Russia, provide those troops with everything they need, and make cuts in the Armed Forces....

Incidentally, the Military Building and Reforms Directorate, headed by Doctor of Military Sciences Major General Gennadiy Ivanov, was the first subdivision of the military department and, you could say, of the Russian Armed Forces. It looks as if military science in the shape of this directorate—and other branches of science as well—has been given carte blanche. A body has been formed to accumulate ideas and proposals originating from various directorates, staffs, and scientific centers.

Nevertheless, in spite of the extremely difficult conditions in which the Russian military leadership now finds itself, an impressive range of measures has been implemented in the six months since the process of building the Armed Forces began. A concept for building the Armed Forces has been formulated. When it has been approved by the president, it will become an official document and create the legal basis for drawing up concepts for the various branches of the Armed Forces and categories of troops, as well as a detailed plan of military building through 1995, with a breakdown for each separate year. It is expected to complete this work in January next year.

The Defense Ministry has drawn up a detailed inventory of available weapons and combat equipment. The process of forming new Armed Forces groupings has begun. So what has actually been done so far? The Urals Military District has been reestablished and the transformation of other military districts has begun: primarily

the North Caucasus Military District, whose grouping is undergoing considerable changes. Planned personnel and arms cuts are going ahead. By 15 November the size of the Armed Forces had been reduced by 180,000 men. The Defense Ministry apparatus has been reduced in size by more than 30 percent (approximately 6,000 members of staff). More than 140 generals' posts have been cut, and 41 directorates and 140 departments and sectors have been abolished. During 1992, the directorates of the high commands of various categories of troops, one military district—the Turkestan Military District—and two armies—the 4th and 7th Armies of the Transcaucasus Military District—have been disbanded, as well as eight divisions and two military schools. Armed Forces staffs will see further cuts of approximately 20,000 personnel by the end of this year.

We should make one proviso. In carrying out the reorganization, the Defense Ministry leadership is endeavoring to prevent sweeping cuts in officer staff and to not lose scientific and intellectual potential. Active measures are also being taken to bring actual and official numbers of Army personnel as close as possible together. All treaty relations with NATO and the United States are based on personnel numbers. Consequently, when the subject of cuts is raised, our partners in treaties and agreements are referring to real personnel, whereas we often have "dead souls." Transformations in troops' staff organization structure are now based on reducing as far as possible the number of units and formations with less than their full complement and moving away from the army and division structure in favor of corps and brigades. It is thereby planned to increase the number of combat-capable units and formations with a full complement, which will be rapidly ready to fulfill combat tasks.

The systematic withdrawal of troops to Russian territory and their provision with everything necessary require considerable effort from the Defense Ministry, the General Staff, and other administration bodies. This year regions of the Russian Federation have received some 100,000 military servicemen, 2,000 tanks, 1,500 artillery systems, large quantities of other combat equipment, and approximately 1 million tonnes of materiel and equipment. It is planned to withdraw 250,000 military servicemen, including 95,000 officers and warrant officers, 120,000 units of equipment, and more than 2.5 million tonnes of property and ammunition to Russian territory by the end of 1995.

We should obviously also mention measures to resolve a fundamentally new task for the Armed Forces: the participation of units and subunits in peacemaking operations, and also as part of collective peacekeeping forces in the CIS. Russian soldiers and officers are currently performing a difficult service in Yugoslavia, the Dniester region of Moldova, Tajikistan, and other regions. Our initial experience of employing peacemaking forces has shown that military contingents to keep the peace and settle conflict situations must be formed on a permanent basis—which is now being done.

One of the Russian military department's assets is that it has drawn up a package of proposals for a new military equipment policy as an extremely important element of the economic policy of a state carrying out reforms. In addition, it has drafted measures to back up orders to improve existing weapons and military equipment and produce new prototypes while preventing their uncontrolled proliferation, which would threaten Russia's security.

The reader will not be uninterested to learn that, in view of the present real situation in the world, the CIS, and Russia and the real situation in which the Armed Forces now find themselves, the Defense Ministry and the General Staff have been compelled to draw up new strategic plans (this work is now nearing completion).

We could also name other very important measures implemented in the last six months. Moreover, while solving these and other problems the military department leadership has not lost sight of the tasks most important for all of us: ensuring troops' combat ability and enhancing servicemen's social protection. The Defense Ministry has now reestablished reliable control of the Armed Forces. That is the most important point, in our view. We can therefore say that a qualitatively new army is now being formed, which meets the requirements of the present military-political and strategic situation in the world.

UN Adopts Resolution on Russian Withdrawal From Baltics

*WS0112130092 Tallinn ETA NEWS BULLETIN
in English 1749 GMT 27 Nov 92*

[From 27 November POSTIMES, p 3]

[Text] Friday, November 27—The resolution passed in UNO General Assembly on Wednesday, November 25, demands quick withdrawal of the tens thousands of Russian military who still stay in the Baltics. The resolution has no compulsory powers to its member states, yet having a great moral meaning in international arena.

The General Assembly consisting of 179 representatives of member states is calling on Russian troops to "early, orderly and complete withdrawal." The same words were used in the final pact of Helsinki summit this summer.

Latvian Premier Ivars Godmanis spoke to the UNO General Assembly on Wednesday, claiming that the stay of about 100,000 Russian military is aggravating national tensions in the Baltic States. "The Russian troops are spying in the neighbouring states, taking control over the reactors, polluting the natural resources and destabilise the situation in the region they stay. Their stay also keeps away foreign investors," Godmanis said. He disproved the claims of Moscow as if there were no place to take the troops leaving the Baltics.

According to the Russian ambassador at UNO Yuliy Vorontsov, Moscow has no secret plans in stopping or retarding the troop withdrawal, it will continue as soon as Moscow and the Baltic States conclude agreements on economic relations and on protection of Russian inhabitants' rights.

This resolution was the first document to be passed in the UNO General Assembly called by the Baltic States. The resolution requires an agreement between Russia and Estonia as well as Latvia on exact time-table of troop withdrawal. An agreement with Lithuania has been concluded already.

Russian Lawmaker: No Baltic Troop Pullout Until Preparations Made

*LD2811162792 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1416 GMT 28 Nov 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow November 28 TASS—"Russia will not withdraw its troops from the Baltics to unprepared territories, the more so in winter," Sergey Stepashin, head of the Russian Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security Issues, told parliamentary hearings here today.

He said a state decision has been taken to build next year 20,000 apartments for officers from troops to be withdrawn from the Baltics.

Stepashin stressed the Russian Parliament and President Boris Yeltsin do not connect the instruction to suspend troops withdrawal from the Baltic states with violations of human rights on their territories, as the Baltics try to present.

"We are interested in the soonest return of our servicemen to Russia," stressed the committee chairman.

He also dwelt on facts of gross violations of rights of Russian servicemen currently in the Baltics and recalled cases they were beaten and subjected to the most rude treatment. "This is done to drive the troops out as soon as possible, but it is clear what can be the consequences of this haste and treatment of armed people—the situation may become similar to what it was in the Dniester region," said Stepashin.

Russian-Estonian Talks on Troop Withdrawal

Foreign Ministers Meet

*OW0212164392 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1616 GMT 2 Dec 92*

[Report by diplomatic correspondents A. Borodin and D. Voskoboynikov; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature; following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The changes that occurred in Estonia, and Estonian proposals concerning bilateral relations roused

interest in Russia, said Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in Moscow on Wednesday, following talks with his Estonian counterpart Trivimi Velliste. An opportunity has emerged for establishing truly neighborly relations between the two countries, he added.

With reference to the process of withdrawing Russian troops from Estonia, the two ministers said that it should be concluded "as soon as it is really possible" in accordance with CSCE documents. During the talks Russian officials pointed to the importance of normal functioning of Russian military facilities and units stationed in Estonia, and to the need of guarantees of social security for the servicemen, their family members, military retirees and defence plants workers.

T. Velliste said he understood these problems, and pointed to the need to resolve them on the basis of Estonia's legislation and bilateral agreements. The possibility of Estonian construction organizations' participation in preparing accommodations for the units to be withdrawn from Estonia is under consideration now, he said.

When discussing the problem of troops withdrawal, the two ministers noted that there are genuine preconditions for reaching understanding on the entire package of problems connected with their withdrawal. During the talks the two sides agreed to submit "a coordinated draft agreement on the withdrawal of Russian troops and on the terms of their temporary presence" to participants in the intergovernmental talks to be held in mid December this year.

The two sides discussed the possibility of jointly requesting the International Atomic Energy Agency to give aid in the process of dismantling Russia's nuclear facility in the Estonian city of Paldiski.

A. Kozyrev pointed out that it's inadmissible to practise discrimination against ethnic Russians living outside the Russian Federation. In this connection T. Velliste said that an institute of human rights is being formed under the auspices of Estonia's President. According to him, the Estonian authorities are willing to help the permanent residents of Estonia to acquire citizenship on the basis of its legislation and international commitments.

He said that the procedure of passing examinations for the knowledge of Estonian will be simplified for elderly people and for those with health problems who are non-Estonians by birth. The two ministers agreed that what the Estonian authorities pursue is a policy of integrating Russian-speakers into Estonian society, not the policy of forcing them out.

The two sides also discussed the possibility of opening cultural centers in Moscow and Tallinn. They agreed to step up the consideration of issues connected with the opening of Estonia's consulate in St. Petersburg and Russia's consulate in Narva.

Participants in the talks signed a consular convention.

On Thursday T. Velliste is to confer with Russia's First Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Shumeyko to discuss economic relations between Russia and Estonia.

Meeting Called 'Successful Beginning'

WS0412130892 Tallinn ETA NEWS BULLETIN
in English 1144 GMT 3 Dec 92

[From Dec 3 RAHVA HAAL, PAEVALEHT, p 1]

[Text] Thursday, December 3—Estonian Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste met his Russian counterpart Andrey Kozyrev in Moscow yesterday. The meeting was described as a "successful beginning of an intensive dialogue".

The most important results of the meeting concern the Russian military pullout. According to an agreement reached between the ministers the withdrawal talks are to continue in mid-December. The negotiations were also described as successful concerning the preparation of troops withdrawal agreements. But definite deadlines were not yet discussed, the ministers said at a news conference. Velliste mentioned Estonia's willingness to participate in the construction of housing for the Russian military leaving Estonia. Both sides also discussed the possibility of involving international organizations in dismantling the nuclear reactors in Paldiski.

Kozyrev mentioned the human rights of the Russians in Estonia again, but unlike the earlier times, in a less aggressive way. Social favours of Estonian inhabitants will not apply to the former Soviet military and the KGB members, Velliste added. Kozyrev had stressed the need for social guarantees to the Russian military, their families and the Soviet Army veterans as well as defence enterprises' staff.

Russian Delegation Head Outlines Proposals

OW0812113292 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1106 GMT 8 Dec 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The head of the Russian delegation to the talks with Estonia Ambassador Vasiliy Svirin has told BF [BALTFAX] that the Russian side suggests submitting the draft agreements on citizenship, the withdrawal of Russian troops and terms of their temporary presence in Estonia to the next round of negotiations on December 15 and 16.

He said Moscow will invite Tallinn to sign the initialled agreement on life-support services of neighboring territories which is very important not only for the population of the border areas of the two countries, but for the normal functioning of the industries there.

Mr. Svirin hopes that during the December meeting the two sides will manage to initial the finalized understandings on pensions and assistance to voluntary settlers. A

draft agreement on the social security of Russian servicemen and retired officers will also be discussed.

The Russian spokesman said that the two neighboring countries have not signed the trade agreement for 1993. It has been drafted and will soon be finalized by the official delegations.

According to Mr. Svirin, the draft can be submitted to the meeting of prime-ministers which is expected next January. The possibility of such a meeting was mentioned during the recent visit to Moscow by Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste.

Reports on Russian Troop Withdrawal From Lithuania

Russian Officer: Withdrawal on Schedule

*OW0212172992 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1658 GMT 2 Dec 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On Wednesday the newspaper "LIETUVOS RITAS" reported that Russia's military presence in the Lithuanian capital is being completed. However Colonel Valeriy Frolov, the commander of Russia's 107th motor-rifle division, reported to BALTFAX over telephone that this newspaper "was a little bit in a hurry" having published this message.

Speaking with the correspondent from his cabinet, the colonel made it clear that he is not the single serviceman who is staying in the so called "North cantonment" in Vilnius where the main forces of the division are stationed.

At the same time, according to the division commander, the withdrawal of the division is being accomplished according to the plan. "The withdrawal will be completed in time," the commander declared.

According to the schedule of forces withdrawal signed by the Lithuanian and Russian Defense ministers, the 107th motor rifle division will leave Lithuania before December 15.

Lithuanian Premier, Baltic Fleet Commander Confer

*LD0312162892 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1500 GMT 3 Dec 92*

[Text] Admiral Vladimir Yegorov, commander of the Russian Federation Baltic Fleet, was received today by Lithuanian Prime Minister Bronislovas Lubys.

The Lithuanian prime minister stressed that the government's stance on the withdrawal of Russian troops deployed on the territory of Lithuania would not change and that he would aspire that the agreements that had been signed are carried out.

All issues regarding relations with Russian servicemen, their transit across the territory of Lithuania, the construction of dwellings, and other commercial agreements should be carried out only on a parity basis. If higher prices than those fixed for other countries are demanded for the oil and gas purchased from Russia then the rates for the use of Lithuanian railroads and other transport by Russia would be fixed accordingly. At the same time, we stand for proper relations and bilaterally beneficial cooperation, Lubys said.

The admiral said that the appointment of the Russian Vice Prime Minister Vladimir Shumeyko as leader for the negotiations with the Baltic countries offers hope that the problems with regard to the troop withdrawal will nevertheless be solved. Vladimir Yegorov said that the leadership of the Baltic Fleet would like to base their relations with the leadership of Lithuania and the servicemen on goodwill and long-term cooperation.

Further Report

*WS0712130292 Vilnius ELTA NEWS BULLETIN
in English 1454 GMT 4 Dec 92*

[From ELTA "NEWS BULLETIN" No. 137]

[Text] 4 December 1992—Yesterday Prime Minister Bronislovas Lubys received Commander of the Russian Baltic Fleet Admiral Vladimir Yegorov.

Prime Minister noted that the stand of the Government of Lithuania on the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces remained unchanged and that it would strive for the due implementation of the concluded agreements. All the issues of the relations with the Russian military, their transit through the territory of Lithuania, construction of dwelling-houses and other commercial contracts must be carried out on a parity basis. If Russia continues to demand for oil and gas from Lithuania prices higher than those it sets for other countries, the tariffs for Russia's use of the Lithuanian railway and other means of transport will be set accordingly. Prime Minister stressed that Lithuania insists on correct relations and mutually beneficial cooperation with Russia.

On his part, the Russian Admiral informed Prime Minister of Lithuania about the recent setting of the Russian Defence Ministry at which problems of the Russian troops removal from the Baltic States and the lack of housing facilities for the servicemen in Russia were discussed. Still, Admiral V. Yegorov noted that the appointment of Russia's Vice Premier Vladimir Shumeyko to head the Russian delegation in the negotiations with the Baltic States gives a good ground to believe that the problems connected with the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces will be solved. He concluded that Chiefs of the Russian Baltic Fleet wish to base their relations with the Lithuanian Government and military forces on good will seeking to ensure constant cooperation.

Ukmerge Base Turned Over

WS0712130692 Vilnius ELTA NEWS BULLETIN
in English 1456 GMT 4 Dec 92

[From ELTA "NEWS BULLETIN" No. 137]

[Text] 4 December 1992—On December 3rd a inter-departmental committee took over the Soviet army anti-aircraft rocket regiment territory in Ukmerge. Official documents will be signed in a few days.

The Ukmerge regiment belongs to the dislocated 107th motor-rifle division. Military equipment and soldiers left Ukmerge earlier.

This weekend officials from the Ministry of National Defence, ecology specialists and city official will inspect the Vilnius 'Northern village' (Siaures miestelis), the headquarters of the 107th division. The last soldier should leave the Northern village by December 15th. This would fulfill one of the most important agreements between Vytautas Landsbergis and Boris Yeltsin. During the month of September, it was agreed that the foreign army would leave Lithuania's capital by the New Year.

According to the agreement signed between the Russian and Lithuanian Defence Ministries, these units should withdraw from the Lithuanian territory: 18th transport division from Panevezys and Kedainiai, fighter and bomber plane regiment from Siauliai, special radio-electronic fighter plane regiment from Siauliai, special helicopter regiment from Kaunas, 3rd shore division Klaipeda and Telsiai regiments. Currently in Lithuania there are approximately 20 thousand soldiers under Russian jurisdiction. At the beginning of the year there were 35 thousand.

Russian Troops Begin Departure From Prienai

LD0312172492 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1200 GMT 3 Dec 92

[Vincas Staniulis report from Prienai]

[Text] The withdrawal of Russian servicemen and military hardware from the military unit deployed in the town of Prienai has started. Today, 17 light tanks of various kinds were taken to Alytus railroad station, from where they will be transported to Russia. [passage indistinct]

The Russian servicemen maintain that by the middle of next April there will be no servicemen left in Prienai and that the buildings of the military barracks and the surrounding territory will be handed over to the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Lithuania.

Russian Parliamentarian Comments

OW0712183192 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1720 GMT 7 Dec 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] "While discussions with the Lithuanian side on the problems concerning the withdrawal of the Russian troops were taking place, our committee discovered documents which had not received the agreement of the defence or foreign ministries." The announcement was made on December 5th by Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, the president of the parliamentary international affairs and foreign economic relations committee, who was speaking during a closed discussion by the Congress of Russian People's Deputies of Russia's military issues.

Ambartsumov said that as a result of the documents not receiving the agreement of either of the above two mentioned ministries, serious matters relating to the protection of the interests and guarantee of the safety of servicemen were overlooked.

He said that moderate and intelligent forces now held power in Lithuania and that Russia must now find a different approach to the Baltic nations with regard to the solution of military matters outstanding. "We must draw the distinction between those republic with friendly intentions towards Russia and those who manifest either hostility or lack of understanding," Ambartsumov said.

Russian Defense Ministry Troop Withdrawal Schedules

OW0312232092 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2000 GMT 3 Dec 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The withdrawal of the Russian forces from the territories of other states corresponds to bilateral agreements and schedules. The press service of the Russian Defense Ministry reports that about 100 thousand servicemen, almost 2 thousand tanks, 15 divisions, 23 rocket, artillery, and air defense brigades, 36 aircraft and helicopter companies were introduced to Russian territory in 1992.

The press service points out that in 1991 the withdrawal of forces from Czechoslovakia and Hungary was completed; by September 25 forces were withdrawn from Mongolia; on October 28, two weeks before the scheduled term, the military units of the Northern Group of Forces left Poland. The Russian forces will leave Germany by late 1994; by now 60% of military personnel and 72% of equipment and armaments have been withdrawn from this country.

The Defense Ministry reports that almost 248 thousand servicemen, 1.8 thousand tanks, 2.1 [as received] artillery guns, more than 1 thousand aircraft and helicopters are scheduled to be withdrawn from the composition of the Western, Northern, North-Western groups of forces, from Transcaucasia and Moldova to Russian territory.

The press service of the Russian Defense Ministry calls the problems connected with the accommodation and deployment of forces the main obstacle on the way to their withdrawal. According to the press service, at present 106.5 thousand families of servicemen have no apartments.

A special program of living construction has been developed and is being realized for the forces withdrawn from Germany. This program envisages the construction of 36 thousand flats on CIS territory, 27,320 of them—on the Russian territory. Germany has allocated 7.8 billion DM for this purpose.

In 1992 the Russian Defense Ministry constructed 74 living houses comprising 4.4 thousand apartments, 37 hostels containing 1.8 places [as received], 13 military barracks for 2.3 thousand people, 2 soldier canteens, and a school for 834 pupils.

In 1993-1994 the Ministry plans to build 412 living houses for 24.8 apartments and 64 hostels for 6.7 places [as received], and also a number of social-cultural buildings.

Civil construction organizations are in charge for the construction of other 70% of sites planned by the state program on the withdrawal of the Russian forces.

Latvia Bars Transit of Russian Tanks

*OW0312173792 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1708 GMT 3 Dec 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] BALTFAX has been informed by Ilgonis Upmalis, the head of the Latvian bureau for the supervision of the withdrawal of the Russian Army from the republic, that the bureau has prohibited the transit of 105 tanks through the republic's territory. The Russian army command intended to direct the tanks along the special rail routes from Tallinn to the Kaliningrad military region.

Upmalis said that this matter should receive the agreement of the chairman of the Council of Ministers of Latvia, since it could not be predicted to what extent the relocation of the military hardware would reflect on the situation regarding military parity in Europe.

I. Upmalis added that, in accordance with Latvia's Customs Codex, this kind of transit of foreign military hardware through Latvian territory was inadmissible.

Russian-Latvian Troop Withdrawal Talks

Latvian Premier: Only Procedure To Be Discussed

*WS0412131292 Riga LETA in English
0754 GMT 3 Dec 92*

[Statement of Latvia Premier"—LETA headline]

[Text] Riga, December 3 (LETA)—Latvian Prime Minister, Ivars Godmanis, having evaluated the UN resolution concerning the Russian Army withdrawal from the Baltic States, announced that further discussion of the Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, has cancelled his decree about the suspension of army removal from Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

Ivars Godmanis also stressed that only the procedure of withdrawal could be discussed, not the status of the troops.

Latvian Foreign Minister Comments

*OW0312193592 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1917 GMT 3 Dec 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Latvian Foreign Minister Georgs Andrejevs said at a press conference in Riga today that Russian President Boris Yeltsin's order suspending the withdrawal of Russian forces from Latvia is the main obstacle to the resumption of Latvian-Russian negotiations on the issue.

Andrejevs believes such negotiations should be conducted by the presidents of the two countries and may take place in January 1993. At the same time, he thinks the negotiations between government delegations should continue too. These may be resumed as early as this month, which means Yeltsin should cancel his order as soon as possible, Andrejevs said.

Russian Spokesman: Withdrawal on Schedule

*LD0412235692 Riga Radio Riga Network in Russian
2100 GMT 4 Dec 92*

[Text] The withdrawal of Russian troops from the three Baltic states continues in accordance with the schedule set at international talks. This was reported today to a [Radio] Liberty correspondent by Vladimir Beketov, a representative of the Russian Defense Ministry's press center. Beketov noted that subunits, which have an infrastructure created for them at places of future stationing, were withdrawn first. As is known, Russia's President Yeltsin made a decision in October this year to suspend the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltics.

Grachev Sees Neglect of Baltic Withdrawal Plans*OW0712180892 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1719 GMT 7 Dec 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russian Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev, stated that neither the Russian government, nor parliament has considered the program for the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Baltic states. The Russian Defence Ministry drafted such a program a long time ago, he said.

This is clear from the verbatim report of the congress's closed session, December 5, which concentrated on the situation in the Russian armed forces and on Russia's military policies. The verbatim report was made public, Monday, on the insistence of the people's deputies.

According to this document, Grachev said during that closed session that on its own, the Russian Defence Ministry cannot cope with the withdrawal of the Russian troops. So he urged the congress either to pull out the troops from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania without delay, or to allow them to stay in those countries for some time on the condition that the Russian servicemen will be provided with all social guarantees and that their rights be observed.

Grachev also said that indignation over moral pressure is growing among the Russian servicemen in the Baltic states. For instance, the local banks are refusing to give them the salaries sent in from Russia.

Neither arguments, nor talks with the leaders of the Baltic states have brought about any progress, said Grachev.

NUCLEAR TESTING**Supreme Soviet Deputies on Future of Novaya Zemlya Nuclear Testing***93WN0149A Moscow ZELENYI MIR in Russian
No 35-36, Oct 92 (Signed to press 1 Oct 92) pp 4-5*

[Articles by V. Menshikov, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee on Ecology and Sensible Use of Natural Resources, A. Veshnyakov, member of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, Yu. Dmitriyev, member of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee on Ecology and Sensible Use of Natural Resources, and Yu. Sergeyev, member of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee on Ecology and Sensible Use of Natural Resources: "A Nuclear Test Range on Novaya Zemlya—To Be or Not to Be?"]

[Text]

Secrecy and Wastefulness Are a Hindrance, by Menshikov

The idea itself of parliamentary hearings came up after we saw the presidential edict to which access by the press was denied. This is despite the fact that we are discussing the need for establishing an open society.

What sort of dangers—political, economic, ecological—could arise with more testing of nuclear weapons for Russia as a sovereign state, and for Russians? Will we not find ourselves in a new upward spiral of the nuclear arms race? These are questions that Russian deputies will have to answer, giving some thought to many problems—not at all simple ones at that.

The first and most important problem is Russia's security program from the standpoint of defense doctrine: Is nuclear testing itself necessary for the maintenance of Russia's security? A couple of years ago practically every one of our fellow citizens would have replied that it was doubtlessly needed, but the situation in the world has changed—a direct military threat no longer exists. Let's consider the second problem: Specifically for what reason are these tests conducted?

Some answer that samples of weapons have to be tested regularly from the standpoint of their reliability—like the way they test conventional shells selected regularly from lots transferred to gunners. Another position is that testing helps in the creation of weapons of a new generation. There is also a third position: Nuclear weapons create huge collectives of the best scientists, engineers, designers and workers. And almost each of these collectives has its own "small professional interest" in continuing to improve "everyone's offspring." This interest is often fed by the interests of livelihood, and even personal interests—especially in today's difficult times: Life is what it is.... Nuclear weapons are the livelihood of enormous collectives, and this is one argument you can't ignore.

In order to raise the problem to the level of state importance and adopt a state decision, we must act hand in hand with the parliaments of foreign countries that possess nuclear weapons, and that understand the full pernicious impact of their very existence. Why not have the United States declare a moratorium on such testing, so that Russian and American politicians would have some time to make unhurried, well-grounded political and legislative decisions? So that neither they nor we would have to worry about a rival coming from behind and overtaking us. This feeling of being overtaken is a sufficiently powerful motivation stimulating the arms race, one which we were unable to endure, but which even the Americans are finding increasingly more difficult to endure. Other countries are getting into the running as well.

Over 50 Russian deputies sent letters to U.S. congressmen whose positions on the problem of nuclear weapons are close to ours. Personal letters—let me emphasize—on the need for a moratorium. Stating that the situation that has evolved in the world provides all of us a unique chance: A minimum of three countries—Russia, the United States and France—could halt nuclear weapon testing and at the same time come up with an answer as to what political and technical efforts must be undertaken in order not to spiral the nuclear arms race any higher.

On 4 August the U.S. Senate voted to declare a moratorium on nuclear testing as of 1 October of this year for a period of 9 months. A month earlier this decision had been approved by the Congress. It is believed that the moratorium will be the first step toward complete cessation of nuclear testing on 1 October 1996. The Senate authorized the U.S. president to conduct negotiations with other nuclear powers and to prepare a plan by which to arrive at a multilateral treaty prohibiting nuclear testing over the entire planet. A unique situation for achieving such a treaty has fallen into place. I personally feel that our parliamentarians made a contribution to this as well. But of course, we have a very serious fight ahead of us, including at the political level, against the proponents of continuing the nuclear testing.

Russian parliamentarians have an especially great need for a breather in the testing, inasmuch as we do not have any kind of normative legislative act that would regulate the procedure itself of such testing. What is permissible, and what is not? What releases would be permissible in view of necessity, and unavoidable, and what kind would not? How does this fit with ecological safety? What effect would there be upon the health of people?

I know from documents that many people have worked on these issues. Safety considerations have always been a priority with us. But we need to know precisely which norms and conditions should be rigidly documented by law.

Let's assume that a political decision has been made to conduct one or two tests. Then we would need a law on conducting nuclear tests regulating them from many aspects, so that we could reasonably monitor the entire process and all of the consequences of the testing, like they do in any law-abiding state, without having to force their way through a bureaucratic curtain of secrecy. You want information? You get it. It's time to determine the jurisdiction over the archipelago. Right now it's territory is under federal ownership, and this is a violation of the law.

Finally, the problem of openness of the "closed zone" of the archipelago, of the glasnost of its entire life, is a problem of today, tomorrow and the past. We need to precisely and objectively explain the effects explosions have had upon nature and upon the inhabitants of the archipelago and its contiguous territories.

I submit that the most negative consequences are not those of the activity of the test range itself, of the tests themselves, but rather those of the blatant technological violations committed at enterprises situated within this region, where technogenic excesses have been especially excessive. This territory essentially possesses a special status; it is a huge defense complex, in which no one had ever given any thought to how man is to live in such a place. It's time for us to analyze, without revising the strategic goals of the military-industrial complex through hindsight, precisely what has come of the numerous explosions in the environment of the archipelago and contiguous territories, where, to make things worse, a

significant quantity of nuclear wastes are buried and where even nuclear reactors are buried. How will such interments affect nature and people? We don't know who should answer for this, but we will analyze things and get down to the truth. But we don't even know whom to ask: Where, what and how much was buried, and how? Those who knew are no longer with us. It's not a question of who to flog. We need to get down to all of the details. This is a difficult thing to do, and it will take a great deal of time. In making the decision regarding the need for studying the ecological state of both the central test range and the territories contiguous with it, participants of the Sixth Congress of Russian Federation People's Deputies knew that they were giving specialists a task that would take more than just a year to accomplish. And so when in June, specialists from the Russian Ministry of Ecology tried to assure us, the deputies and members of the Supreme Ecological Council, here in the parliamentary Committee on Ecological Problems, that they would finish their work by as early as November, this could not but elicit bewilderment and valid displeasure. Just analysis of the documents we are already aware of is itself a laborious and time-consuming job, and access to many of the documents is difficult. And anyway, the ministry's state experts stalled right at the very beginning.

We will try to bring the best experts into this work. Especially from among those specialists who lived and worked in these regions, and scientists from institutes located in our European North. They will carry out the state expert examination competently and in minimum time together with specialists from the Ministry of Ecology. Then on the basis of the expert conclusions we will conduct parliamentary hearings and recommend priority decisions to the Supreme Soviet both on the fate of the central test range itself and on the fate of the entire nuclear testing system. Our committee is working together with a number of other committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviet—we will have to solve not only ecological but also military, political, economic and social problems.

When in late June we asked associates of the Russian Ministry of Ecology to report the progress of this state expert examination to the committee, we learned that a state ecological expert examination committee was only just being formed as a subdivision of the ministry. Once again people responsible for fulfilling instructions of the parliament are taking too long to get started, and are not making any serious effort. What had the ministry done by the end of June? The only thing it had done was to send letters to various entities asking them to provide the necessary information. To be more precise, the letters requesting the information had just been written on the day that this problem was to be discussed in the committee, but they tell us that this is some sort of accomplishment. Three months were wasted, and now time has been irreversibly lost in view of the weather conditions of the North. It will now be extremely difficult to conduct any sort of on-site inspection. The experts would not be able to make much of an analysis based on the documents that

have emerged in their overwhelming majority from the inner sanctum of the military department. This is precisely what worries us: Everyone knows how "objectively and eagerly" this department reveals its secrets.

We wanted to organize a trip by people's deputies, scientists and journalists to Novaya Zemlya in order to study a number of questions on the spot, and then announce the results. We went with our request to the Ministry of Defense—that's the way it's done here—and we never received a reply. Consequently if the military department is able to ignore a committee of the Supreme Soviet so easily, it would not be difficult to imagine how reluctant it will be to cooperate with "foreign" experts! Unless the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Ecology makes an effort of heroic proportions, state ecological expert examination of the problem of a test range on Novaya Zemlya will fail.

This is something we cannot allow to happen—the parliamentary hearings must be conducted on the basis of materials from an objective expert examination, carried out not in the interests of certain departments that continue to be almost entirely uncontrolled, but in the interests of preserving the health of Nature and Man within it, regardless of who he might be, a military man or not, a physicist, a nuclear power engineer or a reindeer herder.

Are We Making It Look Like Nothing Has Happened?, by A. Veshnyakov

The world community is aware of the edict signed on 28 October 1991 by Russian Federation President B. N. Yeltsin, in which he proclaimed a year-long moratorium on nuclear testing, announced the closing of the test range on Novaya Zemlya and instructed the corresponding services to reequip the test range and use the material, technical and scientific potential it has accumulated for peaceful purposes. I know that the edict just about put the military into a tailspin, but it did bring millions of activists and increasingly larger numbers of "greening" inhabitants of Northern Europe over to the side of Russia, to the side of its president. But it wasn't 4 months before the Russian president signed another edict—stamped "not for publication"—of which members of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet learned only 10 days after its signing. This edict, dated 28 February 1992, took the absolutely opposite side of the previous one. It declared the need for continuing "tunneling operations" at the Novaya Zemlya test range, which is now called the Russian Central Test Range. The land on which the test range is situated was transferred to Federal ownership. The president instructed the government to support the activity of the test range and to ensure its readiness for two to four tests a year, should the moratorium be lifted. The president's edict was coordinated neither with the Russian Supreme Soviet nor with government organs of Arkhangelsk Oblast, in which the test range is located.

There were no bounds to my amazement or that of many other members of the Supreme Soviet and my compatriots in the oblast! This edict created anxiety among tens and hundreds of millions of people in Russia, in all the world, because first of all it fundamentally changed the situation, and second, this vitally important decision, upon which the fate of not only a relatively small territory but also of all Russia, and to some degree of the entire world, depends, was adopted in secret, by a small circle of highly placed persons. What this leads to is well known—there are more than enough examples.

What can we do but plug our ears, close our eyes and say to ourselves: "The president has a better picture, the president knows better, the president published the edict, and we must obey it..."? Do we create the appearance here in parliament and throughout all of Russia that nothing has happened? Do we keep on working like nothing ever happened? No, neither I nor you have such a right. No one in Russia who still has his common sense and memory does.

Uniting efforts with representatives of the public and of several state structures on the scale of all of Russia and Arkhangelsk Oblast, we, the Russian people's deputies, decided here in the Supreme Soviet to influence the course of events.

We considered two courses of action. The first was a rather forceful confrontation with the president, going as far as appealing his edict in Constitutional Court. The essence of the second is to try to minimize the possible negative consequences of implementing this edict, or to block the possibility itself of its implementation by adoption of additional normative acts, and other documents. That is, one way or another, to achieve a real moratorium on nuclear testing not for a year and not for two, but as they say, "over the next few years"—and not only in the Russian Federation, but also in other states. And of course, to create a situation where decisions of such vital importance to the country would no longer be made by the president without the consent of the Supreme Soviet.

In our opinion the second course is more promising, it is the one we selected, and it is clear today that the choice was correct.

An inquiry was made of the president regarding his edict at the Sixth Congress of Russian Federation People's Deputies. The president was asked to repeal it insofar as it conflicts with Russian legislation.

When I signed this inquiry, I must say that I had no certainty that we would receive a clear and constructive reply. And my suspicions were confirmed. The reply to the deputy inquiry was given not by the president but by Minister of Atomic Power Engineering Viktor Nikiforovich Mikhaylov. By the way, there was nothing in this reply regarding our inquiry.

We worked in parallel in another direction: Problems of the northern territories were to be discussed at the

Congress. The fate of the Novaya Zemlya test range has a direct relationship to these problems. We proposed introducing the following wording into the draft resolution of the Congress (as I roughly remember): to instruct the government to conduct an ecological expert examination of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and territories contiguous with it during 1992, and only after that, with regard for the results of this expert examination, to submit proposals to the Supreme Soviet before the end of the year on the suitability of the continued existence of the nuclear test range on Novaya Zemlya. The Congress adopted this wording, and you will find it in the resolution on socioeconomic development of the North. Thus we laid the legal basis beneath the mechanism for adoption of a final decision on the matter: whether the test range is to be or not to be. This decision will be made not by a small circle of persons at the summit of executive power in our state, but by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. I feel that in this way we have ensured the country against the probability of a voluntaristic decision on a problem of such seriousness as resumption of nuclear testing on Novaya Zemlya.

Later on, when the Supreme Soviet was discussing the Law on Defense, we came across the following wording in its draft: The president sanctions nuclear testing. All of the corresponding rights and powers were given to the president in this draft law. Feeling this wording to be inappropriate, we offered another, which passed in the second reading: Sanctioning nuclear testing is a right of the president, and it will continue to be his to exercise, but as with other special tests (chemical for example), these tests may be conducted only within the framework and under the conditions of programs approved by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation.... Such is the legal basis we were able to lay for deciding the fate of the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test range, and I have no reason for doubting that it will work.

With what result? That's another question. In order that no false starts occur, in order that this legal basis could be reinforced and widened, we need to ensure its high scientific authority and extensive propaganda support.

While it is unfortunate that the State Ecological Expert Examination Committee took so impermissibly long to get started, it finally did begin its examination of the materials available on problems of the ecological state and use of Novaya Zemlya and contiguous territories. By the beginning of October the government and the Supreme Soviet should receive the first expert conclusions on these materials. Also, unfortunately once again, it is evident that the experts have missed the most productive time for carrying out research directly on the territory of Novaya Zemlya. When they told us in the Committee on Ecological Problems that "letters of request had already been drafted" in the departments, half of the summer had already passed.... An integrated expedition began working in July under the guidance of P. V. Boyarskiy on Novaya Zemlya and contiguous territories, but not at the test range. The results will be considered by the State Ecological Expert Examination

Committee. As far as I know, coastal waters of the archipelago will be studied, or are already being studied, by a Russian-Norwegian expedition.

It is no longer a secret to anyone that nuclear reactors are resting in the coastal waters of Novaya Zemlya. Including off of the icebreaker "Lenin." There is information that nuclear and chemical projectiles are buried there. As for what their condition is, and what their influence upon the natural environment might be, we do not have sufficiently complete and dependable information. The most important thing is to obtain this information in the immediate future, so that we could weigh it and determine the fate of the region. This ecological part of the problem of Novaya Zemlya is beginning to get at least some attention, but there is another, no less important one: Are nuclear tests needed at all?

There are two points of view. The commonly accepted one is this: As long as nuclear weapons exist, nuclear tests must be carried out as well. But there is another opinion—some scientists, including nuclear physicists, feel that the problems of improving and determining the condition of stored nuclear weapons could be studied and solved without nuclear testing—several sufficiently precise models exist. Which of these points of view is correct? The answer should be sought and found jointly by the Supreme Soviet and government structures. Committees of the Supreme Soviet on problems of defense and security and on the problems of ecology and sensible use of natural resources have already conducted hearings in which nuclear scientists presented and substantiated their points of views on this problem. Experts participating in the hearings concluded that the discussion must be continued, that a series of such hearings would be indispensable. We agreed to continue this work.

One other part of the Novaya Zemlya problem is the favorable military-political situation, which has provided us with a unique chance for imposing a moratorium on nuclear tests not only in Russia and in France, which has come over to its side, but also in the USA. We, the members of the Russian Supreme Soviet are attentively watching the processes occurring in the U.S. Congress, where an interesting situation is now evolving. The overwhelming majority of the House of Representatives favors a moratorium on nuclear testing, and for practical purposes it has already decided to adopt an initiative regarding this in the next year. But in the Senate the situation is more complex: This spring, only a third of the 100 senators favored such a decision. We appealed to those senators who doubted the need for a moratorium—there were around 50 signatures affixed to the documents. We gave the justifications for our position, explained our view of the problem, and asked them to support introduction of a moratorium on nuclear testing in the USA. Such a moratorium is necessary, we feel, primarily in order to create a breathing spell in the nuclear race, which has now gone on for several decades. Let's stop, take a look around, and evaluate what has happened in the USA and on our Novaya Zemlya. And then we could decide what to do next (jointly perhaps) in order to keep industrial and military

structures interested in the tests from dragging our state and our people into another stage of a mindless nuclear race, which may ultimately result in more than a thousand Chernobyl disasters.

There is information that our appeal received a positive response. Over half of the U.S. senators already feel it necessary to respond to the Russian moratorium with a moratorium on nuclear testing in the USA. There is information that in the beginning of August¹, at the time of adoption of the U.S. budget for 1993, a positive decision will be adopted by the Senate. Then we will fight with tripled effort for a nonnuclear future for the test range on Novaya Zemlya. And if the U.S. Senate refuses to support imposition of a moratorium on nuclear testing in the USA, the hands of primarily those military people here and in the USA who are arguing for nuclear testing will be untied. Then, I fear, there will be no stopping them in the immediate future. And by 1996, when the term of the Nuclear Arms Nonproliferation Treaty expires, another 15 countries that are ready to produce and test nuclear weapons will not be bound by any international legal and moral constraints. There are not five but 20 states in the world that are producing nuclear weapons. A terrifying thing....

And finally, let's recall the package of social guarantees to the population residing in our region and working at nuclear facilities. Special measures must be taken to restore their health, to provide compensation for the risk of being near the facility, for doses of radiation already received, and for those that are yet to be received.

The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation must study all of these problems and materials from all aspects of these problems—and document its conclusions in the corresponding legal acts, which will clearly prescribe to all of our government and nongovernment structures the particular course of behavior to be followed in a given situation. I am not about to guarantee that the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation will decide today to prohibit nuclear testing—we are not on this planet alone. But I do guarantee that the faster we in Russia and they in the USA and in all the world come to this decision, the safer the world we share will be.

Let's wait until the middle of autumn.

Still the Terra Incognita, by Yu. Dmitriyev

We were furnished with interesting and, it seems to me, conscientiously gathered and processed, fully objective material from a survey of the area. Aerial surveys taken from a helicopter showed that this territory contains traces of uranium, thorium, potassium-40 and cesium-137. While there are no areas of continuous radioactive contamination, spots of contamination do exist. The condition of the territory does not elicit any apprehensions.

But the question that arises is this: How large was the territory that was investigated, and could the state of affairs throughout the entire archipelago be judged on the basis of conditions within this territory? What we

learned was that the object of this helicopter survey was an insignificant part of the territory of the archipelago, rather far away from the test range.

Can a conclusion of any seriousness be made on this basis? By the laws of logic, no. And by the laws of life, no. Because we have no idea of the places where the tests were conducted, or of the places where radioactive wastes and reactors are buried. We know practically nothing about the radiation situation on the archipelago. This is a kind of terra incognita, an unknown land. It must be discovered in the direct sense of the term—it has been closed, after all, as an object of special state importance and secrecy.

A representative of the department familiar with all of this was supposed to have attended this meeting of our committee. But it seems as if no one invited him. Because it turns out that this department had not participated in this most remote helicopter survey of the territory. How can I base my opinion on the conclusions of an expert examination in which the principal character did not participate? The conclusion that I reached with what I believe to be fully valid grounds is this: The work that had been done up to the end of June cannot in any way be thought of as serious. Experts of the Russian Ministry of Ecology must forcefully demand that the military department precisely point out all of the locations where explosions had occurred.

We want to know the truth not out of curiosity and not even out of satisfying a generally natural sense of justice. We must go on to a correct and weighted conclusion on the question as to whether the nuclear test range on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago is to be or not to be.

The work is dragging on slowly, the clock is ticking, and in 3 months experts of the Ministry of Ecology have not come to understand how serious the work assigned to them is to the country.

Go There, I Don't Know Where..., by Yu. Sergeyev

The question we discussed in late June in our committee had a somewhat strange name: "Progress of state ecological expert examination of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago...." At first I pondered its regrettably imprecise wording, but it became clear in the course of the discussion that this was precisely the assignment that specialists of the Russian Ministry of Ecology and organs of the State Ecological Expert Committee received.

And anyway, is it really possible to conduct an ecological expert examination of an entire archipelago? This isn't something that can be covered, after all, by a single project, a single report.

As it turns out, what is important is not a terminological error. What was done was by far more complex. Or stupider? Or perhaps, shrewder? Having failed to state exactly what the object of expert examination should be, what will we hear from the experts? In what precisely are we interested? And the experts, not knowing exactly

what questions they must find answers for, will begin to seek general answers to general questions.

The discussion proceeded with great difficulty and nervousness. Some deputies felt that in addition to subjecting documents to expert examination, the group of ministry experts should conduct field research, and make its conclusions only on the basis of the cumulative data. Others believed that it would be enough to subject documents on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago to expert examination. Still others wanted to limit themselves to analysis of materials only on the nuclear test range. It was precisely the ambiguity of the assignment that generated such a diversity of opinions, and consequently the first thing that our committee did after hearing out the experts was to define the goal and clearly pose the task. Now the experts know exactly what we want to know.

I believe that our committee needs to finally learn the true state of affairs at the test range, on the archipelago and on territories contiguous with it. Until research on territory contiguous with the nuclear test range is conducted, no answer can be given to the principal question—the suitability of the existence itself of a nuclear test range on Novaya Zemlya. Research on the health of the population of these territories is especially needed. This is why I suggested to members of the expert group from the Ministry of Ecology to determine primarily the correctness and sufficiency of the materials that will be submitted to them for expert examination. The possibility that the documents submitted for expert examination are insubstantial must be excluded.

But as it turned out, the expert group from the Russian Ministry of Ecology was not prepared to embark upon this big, difficult job. In late June it still did not have the documents it needed. In the three preceding months, so little was done out of the volume of work that had to be completed that both the deputies and members of the Supreme Ecological Council and representatives of the region and public organizations attending the committee meeting were justifiably angered. We were told that letters requesting the needed documents and materials had been drafted (and had not even been sent!). And that's all?!

Even if the requests are satisfied quickly, we have still missed our chance to properly verify the information we have received on the spot: The Arctic summer and the Arctic navigation season are short. And if we consider that the information must come from departments interested in the very existence of the test range, in conducting nuclear tests and in concealing the truth about the consequences of tests conducted in earlier years, we can predict that the response to the requests will be slow, that the replies to very specific questions will be indefinite, to put it mildly, and that the objectivity of the conclusions of the expert group will most probably be doubtful. And it is on the basis of the conclusions of this group, after all, that our committee will have to develop proposals for the Supreme Soviet upon which much in the fate of the country and all the people depends. It was

precisely for this reason that I asked the experts from the Ministry of Ecology to realize their enormous responsibility for the work of state importance assigned to them.

Footnote

1. This article was written in mid-July of this year.

Unexploded Nuclear Device at Semipalatinsk Noted

PM3011145592 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 28 Nov 92 p 1

[Report by correspondent Ye. Dotsuk: "Nuclear Mushroom Under Tekelen Mountain?"]

[Text] Alma-Ata—Recently the inhabitants of Kazakhstan were frightened by the latest secret of the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing ground: There were reports that several nuclear devices placed in deep shafts before the moratorium on tests was announced have remained unexploded. Official denials followed immediately.

But then there appeared one Yu. Vladimirov who said he worked at the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing ground from 1987 to 1990 and was in the very group that placed the nuclear devices in the shafts. The main point of Yu. Vladimirov's story was that automatic detonators were installed; that is, he believes it is not unlikely that they could operate in 1993-1994.

Olzhas Suleymenov, leader of the "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" antinuclear movement, told the editorial office of a local newspaper that he does not doubt these facts, also confirmed by a specialist now working in Kurchatov.

I managed to get answers to my questions, thanks to the assistance of K. Suleymenov, Kazakhstan's state adviser, and K. Serikbayev, chief of the defense department of the president's apparatus. Major General Safronov, deputy chief of the testing ground, explained the nuclear devices situation. According to Fedor Fedorovich, there really is a nuclear research device [yadernoye fizicheskoye ustroystvo] under the ground of the Semipalatinsk testing ground. It was buried before the introduction of the moratorium, and scientists and the military intended to observe the effect of the explosion on various technical devices nearby. The yield of this nuclear device, General Safronov said, is 0.35 kilotonnes; that is very small. General Safronov also indicated the precise location of the shaft: Tekelen mountain. The device is buried at a depth of 500 meters. Here the height of the mountain itself is 125 meters. It is now truly impossible to render the nuclear device harmless and remove it from such a depth. It is true that the Russian scientific center is studying various methods of rendering it harmless. One method, the most likely, is to try to make a second, parallel, shaft in order to remove the device from the other side. This would be very expensive, but to all appearances, work on removing the nuclear "gift" will begin in any case—most likely not before April 1993.

Rumors of 'Several' Unexploded Devices Refuted

*PM0212112192 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 2100 GMT 30 Nov 92*

[Report by Marianna Maksimovskaya; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The inhabitants of areas adjacent to the Semipalatinsk test range are alarmed by rumors that several nuclear charges, placed in the gallery just before the test ban was implemented, remain unexploded. Official refutation of this information was not long in coming but, in its own turn, was soon refuted by officials. According to the deputy chief of Semipalatinsk test range, there really is a nuclear device underground there. At the moment, it is impossible to disarm it and remove it from a depth of 500 meters. All the indications are that work will start on the removal of this nuclear gift, but no earlier than in April of next year.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS**Chemical Warfare Institute Working on 'Conversion'**

*PM3011094192 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1955 GMT 11 Nov 92*

[Report by unidentified correspondent from the "Secret of Chemical Weapons" documentary]

[Excerpts] [Correspondent] This is No. 23, Shosse Entuziastov, home of the State Russian Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology [GSNI-IOKhT]. Since the publication in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI of the article "Poisoned Politics," this institute has been a focus of journalists' attention. The article on the institute said the following: "A new toxic agent with effects that are virtually incurable has been created here." The reaction to this article came on 20 October. One of the authors, Lev Fedorov, was subjected to search and interrogation by the Ministry of Security. His coauthor, Vil Mirzayanov, was arrested and incarcerated in Lefortovo prison. Now Mirzayanov has been released and is under house arrest. But as this report was being filmed he was still in solitary confinement, charged with divulging state secrets. [passage omitted]

Anatoliy Kuntsevich is head of the Committee on Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention Problems under the Russian President. He is the man to whom the authors of the article attributed the main role in creating the new toxic agent. Academician Kuntsevich himself says that the charge is unfounded. The Security Ministry held a news conference that confirmed the charge of divulging state secrets against Vil Mirazayanov. There are at least two questions that have not received clear answers yet. Did the authors of the article actually get involved in state secrets, and if so, aren't these state

secrets in conflict with the International Convention on Chemical Weapons? [passage omitted]

Dr. Fedorov and Dr. Mirzayanov assert that binary weapons were developed at the State Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology on the basis of new toxic agents. This fact, in the view of the article's authors, contravenes the agreement with the United States signed in 1990. The Russian presidential committee headed by Anatoliy Kuntsevich exercises international monitoring on the president's behalf of the observance of the provisions of international agreements in the sphere of the banning of chemical weapons.

[Kuntsevich] The article published in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI which has aroused such intense emotions concludes unambiguously that Russian plants were producing chemical weapons after 1987. On behalf of all government structures, I declare categorically that this does not correspond to the facts. Since 1987, not one plant has engaged in production, not one freightcar or train load has been added to those stocks created in the Armed Forces in 1987. This is an attempt to accuse Russia of nonexistent violations of commitments. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Every developed country must keep its own state secrets. The observance of this duty, according to Academician Kuntsevich, is quite sacred. Kuntsevich's authoritative statements that chemical weapons have not been produced in Russia since 1987, however, still does not answer the question of the existence of an experimental consignment of new toxic agents within the walls of the Scientific Research Institute in Moscow. This institute, located on Shosse Entuziastov, has for many years done work for the Defense Ministry. This is the first time that a TV crew has been able to film the site. [passage omitted]

They showed us the institute's premises that are being used today for work in the conversion sphere. In this laboratory, the toxic agent lewisite is being processed to produce arsenic. According to Viktor Petrunin, director of the institute, no new types of toxic agents or binary systems based on them are being developed at this institute. The examples cited in the article by Mirzayanov and Fedorov, do not, in his opinion, correspond to the facts. On the basis of what we saw we do not consider it possible to draw any conclusions. We wanted to give the various sides an opportunity to express their positions. The chemical weapon or binary system described in the newspapers does not exist on this institute's premises.

[Viktor Petrunin, director of the institute] The fact is that we have never developed the components of any binary system in any appreciable quantities in our institute's experimental plant or in the institute's laboratory.

[Correspondent] The questions raised in this article relate not only to a new toxic agent but also to the environmental danger that the institute presents to the

inhabitants of Moscow. The authors consider that the recycling of waste products is unsafe. The soil has been contaminated with harmful substances, and for that reason when people work on the land, they use gas masks. This is probably overcautious. As director of this institute, can you guarantee that the inhabitants of Moscow are safe, or not?

[Petrinin] I guarantee that unconditionally. [passage omitted]

The institute has on its premises a service that constantly monitors the level of contamination in the soil and water and ventilator discharges into the air. Nevertheless, anxiety is always bound to exist in this respect. It should not be forgotten that in the sphere of scientific research hazardous to human life too often it has been not people's dreams but their worst nightmares that have come true.

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

CIS, China End Talks on Border; Russia To Withdraw Troops

PM0212175992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
3 Dec 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Vladimir Skosyrev report: "Russia Will Have To Withdraw Troops From Chinese Border"]

[Text] Beijing—The eighth round of talks on arms reduction and confidence building in the region of the border between the CIS and China has come to an end. At the talks, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan formed a single delegation.

Bearing in mind that we are talking about a border that extends for 7,500 km, it is clear that there are plenty of complex issues at the talks. Nevertheless, according to one of the participants—Russian diplomat Andrey Rozhkov—the eighth round brought significant success. The main thing was that agreement was reached on how far back troops should be withdrawn. The distance will be 100 km on each side.

China and the four CIS states therefore must establish a 200-km stability zone of decreased military activity along the border. The agreement does not mean that no military units will remain in the zone at all. Some will remain, but their number will be pegged to a maximum level. Offensive forms of weapons—tanks, armored vehicles, combat aircraft, the naval river vessels we keep on the Amur, tactical nuclear weapons, missile launchers, and artillery systems—are scheduled for the biggest cutbacks. The number of border troops will be decreased, as well.

Whose side will the agreement—which still has to be set down in writing—affect the most, ours or the Chinese? It follows from A. Rozhkov's answer that Russia basically will have to carry out the biggest redeployment of troops. The fact is that during the period when relations with

China were strained, we assembled a powerful Army grouping in a narrow strip along our border in the Far East. Defensive installations were constructed there and an infrastructure was set up.

The first major Chinese line of defense is located about 400 km from the border. Naturally, China is alarmed that Russia is maintaining a combat strike force close to its territory. This inequality is out of keeping with the current level of trust between Beijing and Moscow, and needs to be corrected.

At this point one cannot fail to recall the haste with which our troops were withdrawn from East Europe without adequate preparation. Will this story not repeat itself? On this occasion the Russian side intends to be well prepared for all this. First, according to hints from those involved in the talks, the actual process of executing the agreements will be fairly lengthy; it is clear that it will take up to the year 2000. Second, the cuts will be made in tandem with Armed Forces reform, which will enable Russia to maintain a small, but mobile and well-equipped military grouping in the Asia-Pacific region.

The next and ninth round of talks will be held in Moscow.

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Ukrainian Military Doctrine, Nuclear Arms Stance Viewed

PM3011162592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Nov 92 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Kaushanskiy: "Does Ukraine Want To Be a Nuclear-Free State? Parliament Was Not Unanimous When Discussing Country's Military Doctrine"—first three paragraphs are reader's letter]

[Text] "Esteemed Editorial Office!

"The mass media carried a report that the Ukrainian parliament discussed the military doctrine. Was it adopted or not? What is it about?

"[Signed] Captain I. Chernyavskiy, Moscow"

Kiev—The discussion of the military doctrine really was one of the most significant events in recent Ukrainian parliamentary life, as was, moreover, the draft's unexpected return for additional work to be done on it.

But first a few words about the draft law itself. It consists of a preamble and three main parts: military-political, military-technical, and military-economic. The document proposes enshrining the already known postulates about the nuclear-free, non-bloc status of Ukraine, which, so the draft states, "will not be the first to begin combat operations against any state unless it becomes the target of aggression."

At the same time the Republic does not have territorial claims against its neighbors and does not regard any people as its enemy. The draft states, however, that any state that makes territorial claims against Ukraine, interferes in its internal affairs, and forms or joins alliances directed against its political, economic, and military interests will be considered a potential enemy.

The draft military doctrine considers nuclear war inadmissible and does not rule out the possibility that Ukraine, in the event of aggression against it, may act jointly with other powers to thwart or end the attack.

Here it is appropriate to recall the part of the speech by Defense Minister Colonel General K. Morozov, who submitted the draft to the deputies, where he emphasized: The chief question that the document must answer is whether or not Ukraine is to be a nuclear-free state. The reply, you might think, was clear. Moreover, the minister explained to the deputies that the Republic possesses neither the economic nor the scientific and technical means to produce combat fissionable materials or to ensure their complete safety. In addition, any attempt to ensure that Ukraine keeps the status of a nuclear power will entail the virtual scrapping of all international treaties to which it is a party, and this would be a harsh blow to its prestige in the world community. Although, Morozov said, Ukraine intends to have space rocket troops as part of one of the branches of the Armed Forces.

It was, however, precisely over the "nuclear pie" that arguments broke out in the Supreme Soviet. It is curious that demands to retain any ("even the most minimal") nuclear deterrent force were advanced by the very deputies to whom, in his speech, Col. Gen. Morozov expressed... gratitude for assistance in preparing the draft doctrine. Their names are well known: S. Khmara, N. Porovskiy, and I. Derkach; that is, representatives of the radical wing in the Supreme Soviet.

On the one hand, they believe that people will reckon with Ukraine's nuclear muscle, and there is no need to create it because "it already exists," and thus there is no need to invest funds in maintaining a vast army. On the other, "what if politicians of a different kind to now were to accede to power in Russia?" Only six months ago hardly anyone would have voiced such arguments from the parliamentary rostrum. But now this is a reality. One deputy even made an appeal not to ratify the international START Treaty, under which Ukraine keeps its status as a nuclear-free state.

Of course, such trends hardly predominate in Ukraine. But there are still certain "impulses" among the corps of deputies with regard to nuclear weapons. This is also noted by international commentators. It was certainly no coincidence that Leonid Kravchuk "voiced readiness to destroy nuclear weapons or to remove them from the republic's territory" in a telephone conversation with U.S. President-elect Bill Clinton, as news agencies have

reported. Clinton in turn supported President Kravchuk's statement that "Ukraine wants to be a nuclear-free state."

But let us return to the military doctrine. Naturally, the deputies did not return its draft for additional work for "radical reasons." The reasons here are more substantial. They asked in the Supreme Soviet, for example: Is it appropriate for Ukraine today to raise the question of abandoning the system of collective security if this idea is accepted by many civilized states? I will add that such sentiments are maturing in society too. How does one live without partners who can come to one's assistance at a difficult time—above all, without Russia and Belarus, which historically have always been Ukraine's military allies? This is how the draft gathered its "blackballs."

In my view the "wetness" of the proposed doctrine will also slow up the adoption of other important documents, particularly those relating to the structure and strength of the Armed Forces and their manpower of highly qualified cadres. Where are they to be found in the near future, if schools that were once the pride and glory of the Armed Forces of the former Union and, of course, of Ukraine itself, on whose territory they are located, are eliminated, termed as unwanted, on the pretext of reorganizing the system of military education (this opinion was also heard in parliament)? Again there is the problem of troop strength. There are about 700,000 men in the Republic's Army today. It is proposed to reduce the troop strength to 450,000 by the beginning of 1996. At the same time, in line with the defense minister's speech to deputies, 150,000 soldiers expect to return home from the CIS republics, swelling the ranks of the more than 60,000 servicemen without apartments. This is what some deputies argued: On the one hand, the doctrine proclaims a troop reduction; while on the other, it exacerbates the already complex social problems of the military.

Incidentally, what will the proposed military doctrine cost Ukraine? According to Viktor Antonov, minister of machine building, the military-industrial complex, and conversion, more than 400 billion rubles [R] is to be spent just on housing for the military before the year 2000. Technical backup for the army will take R700 billion. It will take a sum total of more than R2 trillion to fulfill the concept of the doctrine. This is in excess of the entire Ukrainian budget.

The Supreme Soviet deemed it impossible to adopt the military doctrine in its present version. According to the forecasts of independent observers, parliament will not now return quickly to this draft. Deputies raised very many questions.

In fact, time is passing, but people still do not mention it. In my opinion, there are two reasons for this. It is not that easy for the Defense Ministry to elaborate compromise solutions that would suit the entire Supreme Soviet. Second, the state, including parliament and the government, now has more urgent matters to deal with; for

example, economic reform where Ukraine is lagging behind many of its CIS partners.

Belarusian Official on Nuclear-Free Status

*WS0412133492 Minsk BELINFORM in Russian
1609 GMT 30 Nov 92*

[“Belarus Will Become a Nuclear-Free State”—BELINFORM headline]

[Text] Today, Yuriy Popov, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council Committee for National Defense, issued a statement in MINSKAYA PRAVDA that “Belarus will become a nuclear-free state.” The republic has turned out to be one of the countries with the highest proportion of troops in Europe, and not of its own free will. The ratio is one serviceman to 45 inhabitants. The troops of the Belarusian military district and the units under central command possess about 350 units of nuclear weapons. Two Army divisions have 54 intercontinental ballistic missiles and launchers. Actually, this is not all. To sum up, Belarus has gained a threatening legacy from the former USSR.

As Yuriy Popov noted, Belarus has started reorganizing and reducing these troops in accordance with the declaration on state sovereignty, nuclear-free status, and neutrality. It has adopted a decision that the National Army will not exceed 100,000 servicemen.

Striving to achieve nuclear-free status, Belarus has removed nuclear weapons for their future destruction ahead of time. In order to prevent the dissemination of nuclear arms and ensure that they are controlled by a single master, Belarus has taken an unprecedented step: It has voluntarily transferred strategic offensive weapons deployed on its territory to Russia’s jurisdiction. At the same time, not a single missile must take off from Belarusian territory without the consent of the Supreme Council of the Republic.

According to the agreement with the Russian authorities, the withdrawal of military equipment and 81 intercontinental missiles from Belarus is planned within two years. There is a hope that the country will become a nuclear-free state by 30 December 1994.

Belarusian Defense Law Declares Nuclear-Free Status

*PM0412095792 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
1 Dec 92 Morning Edition p 2*

[Nikolay Matukovskiy report: “Belarusian Defense Law”]

[Text] Minsk—The law on defense has come into force in Belarus.

Under the law Belarus is a neutral, nuclear-free state which has no territorial or other claims on any country in the world. It rejects wars or the use of military force as unacceptable means.

For the republic’s defense the law makes provision for its own armed forces, border troops, internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and civil defense units. The republic’s defense has the rank of a constitutional obligation, and compulsory military service and voluntary service in the army have been established. By order of the Defense Ministry the Defense Sports-Technical Society will prepare specialists for all categories of troops.

The Security Council of the Republic of Belarus has been set up, headed by Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich.

Kravchuk: World ‘Alarmed’ at Ukrainian Nuclear-Arms Debates

*LD0312224492 Kiev Ukrayinske Telebachennya
Television Network in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 3 Dec 92*

[Excerpts] A military conference on the results of the year’s combat training of the Ukrainian Army took place at the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine today. [passage omitted]

President Leonid Kravchuk addressed participants in the conference. Having characterized Ukraine’s military doctrine, he expounded the position of the state on the main issues concerning putting it into practice. In particular, he touched on the concept of nuclear disarmament.

[Begin Kravchuk recording] The world is watching our actions and our policy in this field—with alarm, I stress. The question is whether to declare ourselves a nuclear state. Today we are not a nuclear state. There are strategic nuclear forces on our soil, the deployment of which I, as president, am able to block today. But I have never reached for, and am not now reaching for, the button to launch them. To block the deployment, and that is it.

So, to declare ourselves a nuclear state is to take on everything—all responsibility, production, maintenance, and so on. Can we do it? I think we can not. And, generally, today this issue is absurd for our state, simply absurd, both from a political standpoint, a military one, a technological one, and other from standpoints.

I think we have another path. This is to create armed forces that are capable of applying force to our potential adversary; and they have to have conventional weapons, as well as the capability of creating weapons based on the most advanced technologies. [end recording]

**Kravchuk: Calls for Nuclear-Armed Ukraine
'Absurd'**

*OW0412131592 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1242 GMT 04 Dec 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk said at a Thursday conference at the Ministry of Defense that to raise the question of Ukraine's transformation into a nuclear power is absurd from the political and technical points of view, among others.

The president emphasized that Ukraine is not currently a nuclear state, although it has strategic nuclear arms. Kravchuk called for the republic's army to be equipped with conventional arms and state-of-the-art technology.

Interior Minister Claims Azerbaijan Has Nuclear Weapons

*NC0712154792 Baku TURAN in English
1127 GMT 7 Dec 92*

[Text] Baku, 7 Dec (TURAN)—Interior Minister of Azerbaijan Iskender Khamidov declared before the journalists that he was keeping an eye on what was going on in Armenia and has effective means to forestall any military operations by Yerevan, in particular, to avert the threat of use the so-called 'weapons of revenge'.

Iskender Khamidov has reaffirmed that he does have the nuclear weapons and added that in Azerbaijan, there are all the necessary means for its transportation to the territory of Armenia.

Still Khamidov flatly refused to clarify what amount and type of weapons he had.

Grachev 'Concerned' Over Ukrainian Nuclear Arms Stance

*OW0712201192 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1932 GMT 7 Dec 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Excerpts] Most military are against their involvement in any political clashes, Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev told the Congress of People's Deputies as it met behind closed doors. According to a short-hand account of the Defence Minister's speech INTERFAX has at its disposal, the Defence Minister urged the congress to "declare a moratorium on the army's involvement in politics for the sake of stabilization and Russia's revival". Grachev said it was necessary to "exclude the 'army card' from the arsenal of permissible means of political struggle". [passage omitted]

On Nuclear Arms

"We are concerned about Russia's relations with Ukraine on the issue of strategic nuclear forces", Russian Defence Minister said. Although Ukraine has pledged to go nuclear-free, the practical solution of that question has been unduly delayed, Grachev said. "Our position is clear and unambiguous. No nuclear powers should emerge in the territory of the former USSR", Grachev said. The Russian Defence Minister urged the Congress of People's Deputies to take steps to promote the "early conclusion of bilateral treaties with those CIS member-states which still have strategic nuclear forces in their territory."

FRANCE

Report Urges Increased Conventional Arms Spending

PM2711154892 Paris *LE MONDE* in French
25 Nov 92 p 9

[Jacques Isnard report: "Main Arms Programs Will Cost 622 Billion Francs Between 1992 and 1997"]

[Text] Over the next five years, military spending on arms should increase to 622 billion francs [Fr] according to a confidential Defense Ministry report which shows a reversal in the trend observed for several decades: Nuclear deterrence will suffer clear cuts whereas the development of conventional and space equipment will be limited by cost.

For the purposes of a military program which plans to allocate Fr308 billion to nuclear, conventional, and space equipment for the French armed forces between 1992 and 1994, and Fr314 billion between 1995 and 1997, the defense ministry analyzed the different costs—at the end of their implementation—of the main weapon systems selected. This task features in an internal defense ministry document (which is unpublished because it is classified). It gives an idea of the scale of the plans in question, because the estimates are so-called "budgetary" or total costs, including studies, development, and mass production of all the equipment to the point of the equipment going into service. In general, it is spending devoted to nuclear deterrence which will suffer clear cuts and spending on conventional and space armaments which should register variable increases according to the categories. This reverses a trend observed for several decades.

Thus, between 1992 and 1997, nuclear deterrence, with a total of Fr135.4 billion, will suffer a gradual erosion of its funding of 6.6 percent on average from one year to the next. This is the most obvious indication that nuclear weapons no longer have the same priority as before. However, in the long term, which goes beyond the duration of the program alone, the projects concerned involve considerable spending.

This is true of the four so-called new generation strategic missile-launching submarines of the Triomphant class which will be supplied to the navy between 1995 and the year 2005. It is a program of around Fr81.5 billion, of which Fr33.6 billion will be drawn from the budget for the years 1992-1997. In addition to these costs, there are others which are considerable.

First, the aim is to build three lots of 16 M-5 missiles for these submarines (one of the four units in turn undergoes maintenance at the Ile-Longue base so that it is only the three which are constantly at sea which need to be armed with M-5 missiles capable of launching six nuclear warheads each with a range of over 6,000 km) at a total cost of Fr38.5 billion. Between 1992 and 1997, it is planned to devote Fr6.6

billion to this operation. Second, it is necessary, before putting the Triomphant series into service, to modernize the armaments of the five existing submarines with M-45 missiles (which each carry six warheads with better performances than the M-4 missiles currently in service) for more than Fr19.6 billion. This renovation has been under way for several years and, so far, some Fr12 billion have been devoted to it.

Space, a Budgetary Priority

In the nuclear sphere, the defense ministry document leaves open the choice on the replacement in the year 2005 of the S-3D missiles buried on the Albion Plateau (in Haute Provence) and of the medium-range air-to-surface airborne missiles which arm the Mirage-IV and Mirage 2000-N planes. The decision on the panoply intended to replace them will be made around 1995.

With regard to the military use of space, the funds allocated between 1992 and 1997 should amount to Fr85.2 billion, with an average increase of 3 percent from one year to the next. Space, from the dual aspects of intelligence and communication, has become a priority for the armed forces, as Defense Minister Pierre Joxe wished.

This is true of the Helios-1 program—two satellites for optical reconnaissance in fine weather—in which Italy and Spain are participating (to the extent of 14 percent and 7 percent respectively) and for which France predicts a funding requirement of Fr7.7 billion. At the end of 1991, spending pledged by France was Fr3.8 billion. At the beginning of next century, the Helios-2 system—four infrared all-weather observation satellites—is to be set up and Fr310 million will be set aside for this in the 1993 draft budget.

For military communications by satellite, France has launched the Syracuse program—four satellites covering one third of the surface of the globe, two of which are already in orbit—for a cost of Fr9.9 billion.

Other, less advanced projects exist for two radar observation satellites named Osiris with international participation of 75 percent and for two other electromagnetic intelligence gathering satellites called Zenon. But these projects will not be implemented before the year 2002.

Atlantique-2 Limited to 28 Planes

In the sphere of battlefield intelligence, the ministerial document reports two other programs: the Horizon system—four Super-Puma helicopters equipped with a radar covering up to 150km—for a total cost of Fr860 million—and the Sarigue system—a long-haul DC-8 plane for electromagnetic research—which will be ordered in 1993 and delivered after 1997 for a cost of some Fr1.28 billion.

This class of weapons, intended for intelligence and communication, also includes the Atlantique-2 program relating to the acquisition of 28 maritime surveillance

planes equipped with very sophisticated communications equipment and torpedoes or antiship missiles. At the end of 1997, 21 of these planes will have been delivered to the navy. The program has been deemed to be so costly that it has been limited to 28 planes (instead of 42 originally) for a total cost of no less than Fr24.2 billion.

In the sphere of naval air forces, the program, with a total of Fr75.6 billion scheduled between 1992 and 1997, enjoys the highest increase in funds devoted to defense—5.5 percent regular increase on average from one year to another. This contradicts the general impression held by many naval officers who think that of the three armed forces and the gendarmerie it is the navy which has been sacrificed most on the altar of budget austerity.

The program for the nuclear-propelled aircraft carrier Charles-de-Gaulle is by far the main investment because the estimated cost is Fr17.2 billion (without the group of 40 planes which is planned to place on it). At the end of 1991, almost Fr4.3 billion has already been spent. Although it is the main piece of the force, the Charles-de-Gaulle does not remove the need for other ships. From this viewpoint, the navy has ordered six frigates of the La Fayette class costing a total of Fr9.6 billion. It has had to limit to six the number of its nuclear attack submarines (of the Amethyste class) instead of the eight scheduled, devoting to them a total budget of around Fr 16.2 billion: To this day almost Fr11.5 billion has been spent.

Fr170 Billion for the Rafale

With regard to air and land operations, the defense ministry document details the fate of the projects started, notably the Rafale plane and the Leclerc tank. With a total of Fr188 billion allocated between 1992 and 1997, this particular sector is having its spending increased by an average of 1.9 percent from one year to the next.

For the Rafale, it is specified that the air force is to order 234 and the navy 86. It is a program—including the cost of the RBE radar and the M-88 jet engine—which approaches Fr170 billion, in other words Fr29.7 billion for development (excluding the self-financing imposed on the manufacturers) and Fr140.1 billion for production. At the end of 1991, almost Fr12 billion had been spent by the state. Deliveries will start in 1996-1997 with two initial planes for both the navy and the air force.

Similarly, for the Leclerc tank, the army has had to set at 650 the total number of orders. This is half what was originally planned. However, the program is still costly: It is expected to total Fr46 billion taking all expenses into account and for the tank alone.

That leaves two other major helicopter programs which concern the army and the navy. These are first, the Tigre-Gerfaut project for an antitank and antihelicopter helicopter produced in cooperation with Germany and

also the NH-90 project for a medium and heavy helicopter designed with Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.

Scheduled to be ordered at the rate of 140 "machines" for the antitank version and 75 for the antihelicopter version, the Tigre-Gerfaut involves a total investment of Fr41 billion for France alone. The future of this program remains undecided. Indeed, Germany, which envisaged buying 212 of the antitank helicopters, seems to want to review its needs for budget considerations but also for military reasons connected with a new analysis of the possible threat. France's partner could, in these conditions, change its mind and make do with 140 machines in a version close to the antihelicopter helicopter.

Finally, for the NH-90, the French army plans to buy 160 (for tactical transport) and the navy 60 (for antiship and antisubmarine warfare). Excluding the shares belonging to each of its three European associates, and the Eurocopter industrial consortium which manufactures the NH-90, France assesses its participation in the helicopter's development cost alone at almost Fr4.68 billion.

GERMANY

Article Views CFE's Impact on European Force Levels

93GE0078A Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND
TECHNIK in German No 11, Nov 92 pp 704-708

[Article by Colonel (General Staff) Ekkehart Brueckner:
"Force Level Limits for Armed Forces in Europe"]

[Text] *General Staff Colonel E. Brueckner belongs to the delegation of the Federal Ministry of Defense at the CFE negotiations in Europe. After studying civil engineering and General Staff training, he was employed in military intelligence, as a G-3 in an armored infantry brigade, as a commander of an engineering battalion, and as a consultant in the Federal Ministry of Defense. Colonel Brueckner has been participating in the CFE talks in Vienna since 1991.*

In the third attempt, we have finally achieved what the fathers of arms control had in mind 20 years ago: limitation of the personnel strengths of the conventional forces in Europe.

The first attempt at an agreement on personnel limitations in the form of the MBFR-talks was ended after 16 years with no specific results.

Another attempt was undertaken by the East, in that it presented a corresponding proposal during the CFE talks. The West, still under the impression of the negative MBFR experiences, was at first hesitant to take up that proposal, however. To be sure, negotiations on personnel limitations in connection with an agreement that includes weapon systems appeared in a new light. Thus, they were prepared to limit American and Soviet forces stationed in central Europe to 195,000 men. But

this very agreement was overtaken by the bilateral withdrawal treaties of the Soviet Union with Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Germany.

After the inclusion of the main weapon systems in arms control through the CFE treaty, the time had come to focus on the personnel component in further efforts to improve stability in Europe in its security policy. The completion of the hardware-oriented CFE treaty through a personnel component was therefore an obvious step. It is the combination of weapons and equipment with military personnel organized in units and formations that yields the military combat effectiveness that is decisive for offensive and defensive capability.

Consequently, with the signing of the CFE treaty in November 1990, all the participating states committed themselves to continue the talks immediately. The objective: a further arms control agreement with emphasis on limitation of precisely these personnel strengths.

It came to this on 10 July 1992. At the CSCE summit meeting in Helsinki, the heads of state and government of the countries that are party to the CFE treaty, now 29 in number, signed the "Concluding Act of the Negotiations on the Personnel Strengths of the Conventional Forces in Europe."

In less than 20 months, then, the negotiators in Vienna had succeeded in working out a troop limitation agreement that

- purposefully supplements and rounds out the CFE treaty,
- establishes a military equilibrium in Europe, and
- noticeably improves the transparency and calculability of the military capability.

The actual negotiations were substantially shorter than the period indicated. They were concentrated primarily in the last months, because progress was at first continually being pushed back by events that set other priorities. Thus the Gulf war and the Baltic crisis overshadowed the Vienna talks and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and along with it the rise of the new republics contributed to the delays in the talks. Beyond that, the attempt of the former Soviet Union to get around the CFE treaty by withdrawing equipment beyond the Urals stressed the climate of the talks. The parallel efforts of the joint consultation group of the states of the CFE treaty to put it into effect also claimed a part of the capacity.

Above all two additional aspects made the talks difficult and had to be harmonized: the political feasibility of national personnel limitations and the complexity of the category personnel. Thus military self-limitation in the respective size of the armed forces turned out—to a considerably greater degree than in the limitation of the weapon systems—to be a sensitive point that hits the nerve of the sovereignty of most of the participating states. In this respect, the figures of the national limitations were not the subject of formal negotiations.

As for the complexity of the category personnel, it was important to register the most varied personnel concepts and structures of the 29 participating states with their range from the conscript to the career army and regular to paramilitary armed forces in a way that conforms to the treaty and that is uniform and equal—almost a classic conflict of goals.

The result was not bad, however. They agreed on

- provisions on maximum national personnel strengths,
- their review,
- the associated exchange of data and information, and
- flanking stabilizing measures.

For the first time in the history of arms control, then, the "Concluding Act" sets forth mechanisms that cover the personnel of conventional armed forces.

The national personnel limitations are the core of the agreement. All active personnel are subject to these limitations, including:

- the ground, air, and air defense forces,
- the land-based naval forces to the extent that they have equipment that is covered by the CFE treaty, and
- the central staffs and units.

Personnel of the reserve must be included in the maximum strengths when they are called up for more than 90 consecutive days and one can thereby attribute to them capabilities that can be equated with those of active personnel. This measure prevents the use of "reservists" to avoid the numerical limitations.

Not affected by the limitations are all nonconventional armed forces, the rest of the naval forces, troops in transit, and paramilitary forces. After the agreement goes into effect, however, newly organized paramilitary formations with the capability of fighting on land may, after the appropriate check, have to be subjected to the maximum limits. Police forces and hence the German Federal Border Guard are not subject to the agreement.

The agreed maximum personnel strengths commit the parties to self-limitation under the principle of adequacy for effective defense. Overall, in view of the very different security relationships—one remembers, for example, the contractual obligations of individual participants outside the scope of the agreement—they represent a balanced result.

In this connection, the overall picture of personnel strengths also conveys politically meaningful strength relationships; it reflects the stability with respect to security that now prevails in parts of Europe. In central and Western Europe, Germany is tops with 345,000 men, followed by France, Italy, Spain, Great Britain, the United States and Poland. Only Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine have larger maximum personnel limits than Germany.

In comparison with the actual figures that were exchanged for purposes of illustration in the first year of

the negotiations, one can generally note a slight tendency toward a reduction. With 19 percent, Germany is subjecting itself to the largest numerical reductions, followed by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and France with cuts of 18-10 percent.

In individual cases the maximum strengths are higher than the actual figures of the preceding year, for example in the cases of Spain and Portugal, or above the planned actual strengths, as in the United States. Their main interest is probably in having adequate flexibility for worldwide crisis management. The comparatively high figures for Turkey, Spain, and Portugal could indicate that the potential zones of tension have shifted from central Europe to the area of North Africa and the Near and Middle East.

The figures for Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine likewise do not show any clear reductions. This indicates, on the one hand, the intention to maintain adequate planning latitude in view of the geostrategic situation. Based on the substantial scope of the necessary restructuring, on the other hand, for the near future one can expect only a limited ability to reduce, if one assumes that consideration will be given to the social consequences for the soldiers to be discharged. Thus, even these figures may well be above the planned actual personnel strength in the long term. With the background of the corresponding political declarations of intent, the expectation of further cuts seems justified.

The agreed personnel limitations must be accepted 40 months after the "Concluding Act" goes into effect, but need not apply for all time. They can be subjected to a revision procedure that allows changes upward or downward under certain preconditions and with established consultation mechanisms. To this extent, the participating states can react flexibly to changing political or actual situations.

The second essential element of the agreement is the annual exchange of data and information to be accomplished on a set date. The provisions in this connection expand the corresponding regulations of the CFE treaty and of the Vienna document on the negotiations on confidence and security-building measures; they thereby serve to further increase the transparency of the potential of the armed forces.

The scope of the exchange of information goes beyond that of the limits in that notification is also required of:

- paramilitary forces assigned tasks of internal security,
- forces placed under the United Nations,
- reservists called up in the previous year for training.

When the agreement goes into effect, the data are to be broken down in the form of the authorized peacetime strengths for the mass of the armed forces from the highest command level down to the independent or separately deployed battalion. This is especially so for forces that are equipped with hardware covered by the CFE treaty. For formations without equipment covered

by the treaty, the information is to be given down to the brigade/regiment level but the latter only after the time when the national maximum personnel strengths must be accepted.

Especially explosive with respect to security and arms control policy is the specific taking up of the subject of the paramilitary forces that succeeded with the exchange of information. Above all, the states in east central Europe were greatly interested in this subject, for with these forces there exists under some circumstances a substantial potential for regular armed forces to get around the treaty. This is obvious not least in the current armed conflicts in the Balkans and in the Caucasus. The rules established for covering the paramilitary forces in an information and consultation regime provide the basis for their further development in subsequent negotiations.

The principle of arms control under which adherence to limits must be verifiable is met through independent verification provisions. These are essentially based on the inspections agreed to in the CFE treaty. On the basis of the knowledge gained in the MBFR negotiations, however, they give up the pretension to want to count every last man. This could not be done anyway, nor is it necessary. Instead, the verification procedure is restricted to the possibility of spot checks as a by-product of the counting of equipment limited by the agreement under the motto: checking personnel along with the hardware. In this connection, Germany is expecting a total of up to 182 inspections of German and allied real estate in the next few months, whereas the states of the former Warsaw Pact must put up with up to 300 inspections. Under certain conditions, the inspectors have access to typical whereabouts of personnel, e.g. quarters, dining rooms, or training facilities.

The inspectors can get the information on authorized peacetime strengths necessary for their preparation from the respective exchanges of data and information. In addition to this, the affected local forces are to provide the actual personnel strengths at the beginning of an inspection. In barracks with several units, this is to be prepared and coordinated between the commanders and the barracks commanding officer.

Three stabilizing measures were agreed to in addition to the provisions previously mentioned. They involve the call-up of reservists as well as the change of structures and the personnel strength of forces. Accordingly, the call-up of reservists is subject to notification when the threshold of reserve-duty trainees exceeds 35,000 men. The measure includes all serving reservists regardless of whether the military training is compulsory or voluntary and regardless of the nature of the specific employment, whether it be military, civilian, or for humanitarian purposes. Furthermore, there is a notification requirement in the case of the continual increase in the personnel strength of formations, so that the facts must be reported to all participating states in a timely manner. To keep the administrative expenditures within limits,

the notification is required only after certain minimum increases in strength. The third obligation for information exists when a force is to be removed from the scope of limits and placed under an area that is not subject to limits. In this case, the attached force is even counted for a certain time against the upper limits. With this measure, the avoidance of the maximum personnel strengths through the change of operational control of units and formations of the regular armed forces to paramilitary forces that are not subject to any limitation is at least made more difficult. Overall the stabilizing measures thereby serve to increase the transparency and nonavoidance of the agreed maximum strengths.

Additional elements of the agreement involve the legal character and the linkage with the CFE treaty. In contrast to this treaty, the "Concluding Act" is a politically binding agreement. It requires no ratification that would hold up its going into effect for an undue time—as in the case of the CFE treaty. Moreover adaptations that may become necessary as things change can be undertaken without this tedious legal act. There is also temporal congruence with the terms of the CFE treaty, so that with its provisional going into effect in July 1992, as agreed in Helsinki, the agreement on personnel limits is already in effect. Questions about the implementation of the "Concluding Act" are handled in the joint consultation group of the states participating in the CFE.

The agreement has special political importance for Germany. With the signing of the "Concluding Act," the rest of the states participating in the CFE have now committed themselves to limit the personnel strength of their armed forces. To this extent, the "Act" puts the self-commitment to reduce and limit the Bundeswehr that was accepted in the "Two-Plus-Four Treaty" on the occasion of German unification in a multilateral relationship.

With the conclusion of the CFE-Ia treaty, as it is unofficially called, the era of disarmament talks between the NATO member states and the former members of the Warsaw Pact as well as the special political course of arms control of the affected states participating in the CFE is finally over. The priority is now to bring the other 23 CSCE states into the settlement achieved for conventional weapons and maximum personnel strengths. These states did not participate in the Vienna talks, because they did not belong to any of the military blocs. In addition, it is a matter of further reductions, limits, and confidence and security building measures for all states participating in the CSCE depending upon progress in the implementation of the existing agreements.

By the time this article appears, the "CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation" that was agreed to in Helsinki will

have begun its work in Vienna. Here the cooperative security system for a new Europe between all 52 states participating in the CSCE is to be further developed through:

- a permanent dialogue on security,
- strengthening the capability for the prevention of conflicts, and
- continuation of the successes heretofore achieved in the area of disarmament and arms control.

As a supplement to the CFE treaty and building on it, the "Concluding Act" is an additional element for this. The achievement of this European security architecture remains the great political challenge of our time.

[Box, p 705]

Article 18 of the CFE Treaty

1. After signing this treaty, the states participating in the treaty will continue negotiations on conventional armed forces with the same mandate and with the objective of building on this treaty.
2. The objective of these negotiations will be to conclude an agreement on additional measures for the further strengthening of security and stability in Europe, including measures to limit the personnel strengths of their conventional armed forces within the field of application in accordance with the mandate.
3. The states participating in the treaty seek to conclude these negotiations at the latest by the next meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to be held in Helsinki in 1992.

Foreign Minister Welcomes UN Approval of CW Accord

*LD0112175592 Berlin DDP in German
0903 GMT 1 Dec 92*

[Text] Bonn (DDP)—Federal Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (Free Democratic Party) has welcomed the approval given by the UN General Assembly to the Chemical Weapons [CW] Convention on Monday [30 November] night. With this "first global agreement in the history of arms control, a further major step has been taken on the path toward a final condemnation of chemical weapons," Kinkel said in Bonn today.

The resolution welcomes the result achieved in Geneva, which was negotiated under the chairmanship of the Federal Republic, and calls upon all UN member states to sign it and cooperate on its implementation. Kinkel assumes that the majority of the 144 states who supported the resolution in New York as cosubmitters will also come to Paris to sign it in January.

UNITED KINGDOM

Armed Services Ordnance Priorities Told

93WC0008 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
in English 10 Nov 92 p 8

[Article by George Jones]

[Text] The cabinet has backed away from swinging cuts in the £24 billion defence budget after warnings from Mr Rifkind, Defence Secretary, that they would put thousands of jobs at risk.

Ministers now believe the cuts—lower than the £2 billion demanded by the Treasury—can be managed without the need for a full-scale rethink of Britain's defence capabilities.

Mr Rifkind considered that savings could be "managed" by adjustments by all three armed forces, with orders for new equipment phased in more slowly. The armed forces are also expected to face a severe squeeze on pay next year, with the Cabinet determined to hold down public sector salaries.

Mr Rifkind said in last week's Cabinet talks that a fundamental review of defence priorities would become inevitable if radical cuts went ahead.

He said that the scale of the proposed cuts would lead to thousands of redundancies in defence-related industries, particularly aerospace and naval shipbuilding.

Ministers feared that the job losses and factory closures at a time when the economy was in recession could create a similar backlash to the recent announcement of pit closures.

Mr Rifkind also argued that deep cuts would be seen as breaking faith with the armed forces, which have already accepted a 25-per cent cut by 1995, and seen historic army regiments amalgamated or disbanded.

—Peter Almond, Defence Correspondent, writes: The Navy appears likely to face proportionately bigger cuts than the other two services after Thursday's Autumn Statement.

Eurofighter, the RAF's biggest and most important project costing £22 billion, is expected to be made a separate case and to be spared cuts. The Army has already made its point that with Northern Ireland, Bosnia, NATO's Rapid Reaction Force and other commitments, it has precious little to cut.

It is falling to the Navy to prove it needs three new ships for amphibious warfare, new conventional submarines, Type 23 frigates, Merlin helicopters and other equipment.

Priorities and vulnerabilities:

RAF: Priorities: EFA, Tornado GR1 upgrade, Tornado F3 upgrade.

Vulnerable: pay, flying hours, ground staff manning, Tactical Air to Surface (nuclear) Missile, Bloodhound surface to air missile replacement, Hercules C-130 transport upgrade.

Army: Priorities: infantry battalions, attack helicopters, AS90 howitzer. Vulnerable: pay.

Navy: Priorities: one new helicopter carrier and replacements for Intrepid and Fearless amphibious assault ships; new Harrier FRS2 jump jets with Blue Vixen radars and Amraam long range air to air missiles; Type 42 Anglo-French frigate.

Vulnerable: pay, steaming hours, deferral of Type 23 frigates, next batch of submarines, amphibious ships, ship refits, Rosyth naval shipyard.

The latter, a contentious political issue pitting 4,500 workers in Mr Rifkind's Scottish backyard against the Devonport dockyard in Plymouth, could save £400 million if completely closed.

A decision is expected by the end of the year, but it could be wrapped in the context of this week's cuts.

The Navy is determined to fight its corner vigorously, and will press hard its value in out-of-area activities, such as sending off the four Sea King helicopters which are leaving today on the fleet auxiliary Argus to help the Army in Bosnia.

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